Creating a coordinated game plan improving teamwork between law enforcement and the California National Guard by Brooks, Robert E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-03
Creating a coordinated game plan improving
teamwork between law enforcement and the
California National Guard
Brooks, Robert E.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CREATING A COORDINATED GAME PLAN: 
IMPROVING TEAMWORK BETWEEN LAW 









 Thesis Advisor:  Stanley Supinski 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Creating A Coordinated Game Plan: Improving 
Teamwork between Law Enforcement and the California National Guard 
6. AUTHOR Robert E. Brooks 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public 
release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The author of this thesis contends that the legislative mandate for National Incident Management System compliance 
has created an efficient and expeditious relationship between civil authorities and military resources, however a lack 
of information regarding each other’s roles and capabilities, coupled with differences in culture, communications, 
logistics, and command and control structures has resulted in sub-par interaction in actual responses and exercises 
since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Emergency responders at the local and state level have frequent interaction, 
but clear protocols, guidelines and exercises are required to create the same level of teamwork with military assets. 
Because of the variety of controlling legislation and political priority governing each state’s National Guard, this 
thesis offers recommendations for improving the interaction between California local authorities, the California 
National Guard, and the United States Northern Command. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
101 
14. SUBJECT TERMS California National Guard, Civil/military assistance, Law 
Enforcement, Mutual Aid 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CREATING A COORDINATED GAME PLAN: IMPROVING TEAMWORK 
BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL 
GUARD 
 
Robert E. Brooks 
Sheriff, Ventura County, California 
M.A., Regent University, 1996 
B.A., University of Redlands, 1986 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Dr. Douglas Porch 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The author of this thesis contends that the legislative mandate for National 
Incident Management System compliance has created an efficient and expeditious 
relationship between civil authorities and military resources, however a lack of 
information regarding each other’s roles and capabilities, coupled with differences in 
culture, communications, logistics, and command and control structures has resulted in 
sub-par interaction in actual responses and exercises since the attacks of September 11, 
2001. Emergency responders at the local and state level have frequent interaction, but 
clear protocols, guidelines and exercises are required to create the same level of 
teamwork with the National Guard. Because of the variety of controlling legislation and 
political priority governing each state’s National Guard, this thesis offers 
recommendations for improving the interaction between California law enforcement and 
the California National Guard through a process of creating common response protocols, 
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One simple but difficult principle provides the opportunity for the United 
States to achieve never again. That is: The will to win. The will to do 
whatever is necessary with the Constitution to protect America separates 
us from more death and destruction within our shores. It is the will to 
sacrifice; to persevere in the face of adversity and criticism just as 
generations of Americans did before us. It is no guarantee, but if we falter, 
grow complacent, or fail to do what we can, we give the terrorist network 
opportunities that, with time and patience, they will exploit to kill more 
innocent Americans.1 
In 2004, some of the best professional players in the world comprised the United 
States Olympic Men’s Basketball team. The American team had never fallen short of 
winning a gold medal since NBA players were allowed to participate. Although they had 
the most talented players, they needed a come-from-behind victory just to win a bronze 
medal. Players with less talent, who knew how to play as a team, defeated them.2 There is 
no question that America’s military and law enforcement organizations are among the 
best on earth, but their interaction in actual responses and exercises demonstrates that 
talented individuals and agencies fall short of expectations when their efforts are not 
coordinated. Instead of an effective unified command, the military and civil participants 
can be reduced to performing like all-stars who cannot play to their potential because 
they do not fully understand their role as teammates and have not practiced to the point of 
confidence. 
In athletics the difference between a winning team and a losing team is often that 
the losing team practices until they finally get a play right, while the team that 
successfully deals with the opposition practices until they do it right every time. The 
reality of catastrophic natural disasters or terrorist attacks is that local and even state 
authorities may have to rely on military and other federal resources in the first critical 
hours of a response. Law enforcement and military emergency responders must have the 
                                                 
1 John Ashcroft, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice. (New York: Center Street 
Press, October 2006), 279-280. 
2 “Dream Team Surrender Title,” BBCSPORT, Newsvote.bbc.co.uk/sport2/Olympics_2004 [Accessed 
Feb 13, 2006]. 
2 
same commitment to planning and practicing for a unified response if they expect to 
maximize the effectiveness of their resources to save lives and protect property given the 
magnitude of the threats that face us. 
A. PROBLEM  
On an average, the federal government needs 72 hours to marshal national 
resources in response to an incident that has surpassed a state’s response 
capacity. Better planning at a regional level could prevent such shortfalls 
in disaster response. Such efforts should take the form of state-based 
regional programs that focus on ensuring that states are prepared to sustain 
themselves and that facilitate cooperation among federal, state, and local 
efforts.3 
Two associated problems arise when local law enforcement and military assets 
are deployed to a domestic event. The first is the lack of a clear, consistent, and practical 
understanding of legal authority permitting and restricting military assistance to, and 
interaction with, civil authorities. The second is when cooperative action is required, 
confusion and friction are created by the difference in culture, protocols, terminology, 
communications and systems between law enforcement authorities and their military 
counterparts. The dual state/federal role of the National Guard presents additional 
complications.  
The historic pace of federal, and especially military response, to police and 
sheriffs’ agencies was acceptable because of the scope of the threats faced by local 
jurisdictions. Because recent experiences including terrorists using planes as weapons of 
mass destruction, the most devastating natural catastrophe in American history, and the 
real threats of chemical, biological and nuclear devices, a 72-hour response is no longer 
acceptable.  
The question this thesis will attempt to answer is whether a common emergency 
management structure can be identified that can be adapted to a terrorist incident or 
natural disaster when the California National Guard and possibly federal military 
resources respond to a mutual aid request from local authorities.  
                                                 
3 Jill Rhodes, “State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the 72-Hour Problem,, Heritage 
Foundation, No. 1962 (August 21, 2006), 1. 
3 
On April 27, 2006, the Little Hoover Commission released a report entitled: 
Safeguarding the Golden State. The Commission is a bipartisan and independent state 
agency charged with recommending ways to improve the performance of state programs. 
Chairman Michael E. Alpert concluded, “Without immediate action by the State of 
California, millions of Californians are at risk in a catastrophic disaster.” The report also 
states, “State law and federal funding provisions require state and local agencies to assess 
preparedness needs, develop improvement plans and participate in training and exercise 
programs but neither OES (Office of Emergency Services) or OHS (Office of Homeland 
Security) ensures that state or local agencies are prepared. The Commission further stated 
that the Office of Emergency Services has not ensured that state agencies are making 
progress toward preparedness goals.”4 It is consistent with the direction of this 
Commission report that state agencies such as OES, OHS and the National Guard take an 
active leadership role in creating a coordinated approach to providing military support to 
law enforcement. 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis deals with the practical application of the National Response Plan and 
National Incident Management System to joint law enforcement and military responses to 
insurrection, domestic terrorism or natural disasters. The problem exposed by the 
response to Hurricane Katrina is that emergency response systems used by the military, 
law enforcement, and other public safety and health responders are not always 
compatible to a “unified command”. The military is trained to operate according to the 
doctrine of “unity of command,” while police agencies apply participatory leadership 
under a “unified command.” A review of prior events demonstrates that when jurisdiction 
for an event is clearly federal or civil, both sectors perform admirably, but little has been 
written to address the grey area of shared command scenarios, which are likely in the 
transition from an initial local response to what becomes a federalized event.  
The primary target audience includes the Governor, California’s National Guard, 
Office of Emergency Services, and Office of Homeland Security. In addition, the 
California State Sheriffs’ Association and California Police Chiefs’ Association should 
                                                 
4 Safe Guarding the Golden State (Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, CA), April 27, 2006, 
Report #184, 34-35. 
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be included as key stakeholders. Any advancement in protocols, practices and training 
should be of interest to USNORTHCOM and the Department of Defense. Members of the 
California State Assembly or Congress may also have an interest if legislative changes, or 
budgetary support, are required. The desired outcome is to establish protocols, change 
existing systems or law, and chart a systematic course of instruction and training that will 
guide local, state and federal agencies through the dynamic and complex situations posed 
by National Guard mutual aid deployments in California. 
The limited scope and time of this thesis will not allow for a detailed discussion 
of all of the areas of incompatibility between active duty forces, the California National 
Guard, and local law enforcement. For the same reason, it is impractical to address the 
relationship between the states and the federal government because each state governs 
their National Guard differently. This thesis will be a success if it can recommend a 
process for creating guidelines for military support that will allow various jurisdictions to 
train and respond in a coordinated fashion maximizing their ability to protect the public 
in the event of a terrorist attack or major natural disaster. If a structure for creating more 
effective coordination can be identified at a state level, hopefully it can be used as a 
model for development of similar models in other states. 
C. ARGUMENT 
The 9/11 Commission stated in their final report, “Although there is awareness of 
and some training in the Incident Command System, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the 
absence of full compliance during a multi-jurisdictional/statewide catastrophe and its 
resulting costs.”5 Confusion over command, control, and authority are some of the key 
barriers to collaboration during an emergency. The objective should be to create 
applications of NIMS that can be used to provide clear direction for law enforcement and 
the National Guard in virtually any response scenario, including dynamic situations 
during which jurisdictional authority changes. 
Differences in technology and terminology also contribute to a lack of 
coordination in a joint response. Systems are available that may have the potential of 
addressing the technical incompatibility. While all of the technical differences may be 
difficult and expensive to resolve, protocol answers such as the use of “plain speak” or                                                  
5 Thomas Kean, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, December 5, 2005, 1. 
5 
the use of a Virtual Command Center could improve the transmission of information. 
Any resolutions that, are proven successful on a state level, could have the potential for 
replication in other jurisdictions. 
In addition to the criticism of the failure to fully implement the Incident 
Command System by the 9/11 Commission, other inputs reinforce the fact that there are 
coordination problems when military resources support state and local responders. The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the Bush administration believes “some states can’t deal 
with large scale disasters.”6 The same article credits USNORTHCOM commander, 
Admiral Timothy Keating, with telling Congress that active duty forces should be given 
complete authority for responding to catastrophic disasters. Finally, the report quotes 
Governor Jeb Bush of Florida as saying, “If you federalize, all the innovation, creativity 
and knowledge at the local level would subside.” With a power struggle at the highest 
levels of government, it is no wonder that authority in a multi-jurisdictional response is 
problematic. 
Conflicts do not exist only at the political level. Assistant Defense Secretary for 
Homeland Defense Paul McHale stated in regards to the Katrina military response, “The 
planning of NORTHCOM was first-rate but was not well known to the National Guard. 
The Joint Staff didn’t have a grasp of the National Guard’s plans. The Defense 
Department must first resolve the poor coordination between the National Guard and 
USNORTHCOM and then reconfigure the National Guard for catastrophic response.”7 
The combined outcome of these problems is instead of having an effective unified 
command, the military and law enforcement responders can be reduced to performing 
below their potential. 
The recent federal response to Hurricane Katrina created confusion about the 
authority of the military to provide civil support, absent a mobilization of the National 
Guard by the Governor of Louisiana or her timely request for federal assistance. 
President Bush finally had to consider using his powers to authorize a military response 
                                                 
6 Robert Block, “Local and Federal Authorities Battle to Control Disaster Relief,” Wall Street Journal 
(December 8, 2005), 1. 
7 Pam Zubeck, “NORTHCOM Official Lists Katrina Lessons,” The Gazette (October 22, 2005). 
6 
to restore order and quell looting and violence in New Orleans. As a result, the President 
asked for broader federal authority in assisting with future natural disasters.  
The Center for Asymmetric Warfare discovered that training exercises involving 
simulated terrorist attacks requiring a military and law enforcement response also 
revealed confusion and incompatibility between emergency management systems, 
communications, chain of command, and terminology. A simulated terrorist attack on a 
deep-water port that serviced a civilian harbor and the Port Hueneme Naval Base 
demonstrated that the various disciplines worked most effectively only operating 
independently of the other. Following one of these exercises, a law enforcement incident 
commander recalled that military and law enforcement participants accomplished their 
missions in the exercise, but without coordination, communication, or a clear 
understanding of a unified command.8 The United States Northern Command is currently 
working on protocols for law enforcement working in cooperation with the military to try 
to eliminate some of the problems experienced in the aftermath of Katrina.9 To this 
author’s knowledge, no similar effort is being undertaken to develop specific and broadly 
understood protocols for the military when acting in support of civilian authorities. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can law enforcement and National Guard forces improve coordination in a 
dynamic unified command response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters? 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF QUESTION 
The hurricanes that battered the Gulf States in the fall of 2005 demonstrated that 
the relationship between local, state and federal agencies responding to natural disasters 
was plagued by confusion and inefficiency. Terrorist event training exercises undertaken 
by USNORTHCOM and the Center of Asymmetric Warfare revealed similar operational 
difficulties.10 The DOD has assigned staff to develop protocols for law enforcement 
when supporting the military in an attempt to improve the situation. In California and 
many other states, law enforcement has no standard protocols or guidelines for the 
National Guard when it assists law enforcement authorities. This author has not been able 
                                                 
8 Martin Rouse (TOPOFF Incident Commander), “Critique of Asymmetric Warfare Training 
Exercise” (November 10, 2005), 1. 
9 Scott Gordon, (NORAD/ U.S. NORTHCOM), interview by author, November 15, 2005. 
10 J. E. Beakley, Organizational Response Initiative, Center for Asymmetric Warfare. 
7 
to locate an existing plan for transfer of command between civil and military responders 
as circumstances change in an evolving situation. If another major terrorist event 
occurred in the United States, it could very well entail complex jurisdictional and 
operational problems involving the interaction of federal, state, and law enforcement 
authorities. It could also require that the primary responsibility might shift from local to 
federal responders and eventually back to civil authorities.11 
F. METHODOLOGY 
While the problems are significant, California law enforcement agencies and the 
National Guard emergency responders have proven to be motivated, well-trained and 
highly effective when acting independently without the complication of combining local, 
state and federal resources. With concerted effort, it is inevitable that these various 
disciplines can and will forge an effective cooperative effort. The goal is to accelerate 
that process.  
1. Problem Identification 
The first step is problem identification. Reviewing the after-action reports of 
actual joint responses and combining that information with the input of subject matter 
experts can best isolate the problems. In California, the Adjutant General of the National 
Guard, the Director of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Emergency 
Services and representatives of the major law enforcement must work together to identify 
problems of coordination and work towards recommending solutions.  
2. Analyze Input for Potential Solutions 
The second step will be to work with major stakeholders to propose solutions. 
Remedies not requiring legislative action or additional funding will be examined and 
implemented first, with other longer-term solutions directed to the appropriate funding 
agencies or legislative bodies. Discussions were held regarding the level of coordination 
between local, state and federal resources with participants and planners of the Center for 
Asymmetric Warfare exercises. The incident commander at the Port Hueneme CBC dirty 
bomb exercise stated that the SWAT and EOD teams were very efficient, but the unified 
command did not comply with NIMS requirements. He felt it was basically several 
                                                 
11 James Petroni, Asymmetric Warfare Training Lessons, November 5, 2005. 
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agencies running their own command and control in the same building.12 The Director of 
the Center for Asymmetric Warfare, who was one of the event planners of the TOPOFF 
exercises, agreed that coordination needed to be improved. He stated,  
I’ve worked in the MSCA/DSCA field for many years, both with U.S. 
forces and foreign military audiences. Usually, the civilian sector has far 
less ‘inertia’, and for a variety of reasons, we give greater autonomy to 
field commanders. For one, our command chains are much shorter, and we 
rely less on the typically detailed plans that the military executes.13  
There is no need to create a new system, because the National Incident 
Management System has already been designated as the standard for all domestic 
emergency responses. The problem appears to be the lack of uniform training of military 
and law enforcement resources, coupled with the need for specific applications of NIMS 
to joint military/civil missions. Specific protocols will be considered to accommodate for 
the differences in state regulations regarding the role of their National Guard units. This 
second phase will bring together those with actual or training experience that can remedy 
the difficulties experienced in the past. 
3. Test Recommendations against the Experience of Key Stakeholders 
The third step will be to test those proposals against the experience and opinion of 
the key stakeholders needed to make the proposal work, and based on their input, refine 
several best practices that could be applied to joint emergency responses in the State of 
California. California is an appropriate place to test recommendations of stakeholders 
because of its size, complexity and the frequency of natural disasters. It is also the home 
of the Center for Asymmetric Warfare, which conducts federally funded federal joint 
civil/military training.  
G. SUMMARY 
Despite the inevitable complexity and confusion that can occur when military 
resources respond to assist state and local emergency responders, there is every reason to 
believe that a clear and effective operational environment can be created. The foundation 
has already been established by the standardization of a National Incident Management 
                                                 
12 Martin Rouse (Commander, Ventura County Sheriff’s Department), interview by author, Ventura, 
CA, November 20, 2005. 
13 James Petroni (Co-Director, Center for Asymmetrical Warfare), correspondence to author, 
December 3, 2005, 1. 
9 
System. USNORTHCOM is already working on protocols for civil agencies when 
assisting the military, so it is logical to expect that they would benefit from protocols 
when the roles are reversed.14 A number of the stakeholders have expressed support for 
working toward eliminating the barriers to improve effectiveness in joint operations. The 
political and public pressure to avoid the conflicts experienced in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina provides needed motivation to change the status quo. 
H. POSSIBLE ANSWERS OR SOLUTIONS  
One possible solution is an amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act to resolve 
some of the jurisdictional questions by amending the controlling legislation. An 
amendment would require an Act of Congress based on recommendation from the 
appropriate sub-committees. 
Another solution would be to supplement the National Incident Management 
System to include clear national protocols for both law enforcement and military 
authorities when working at all stages of a unified command. This would require focus 
groups representing all disciplines to create standards that would meet the requirements 
of national police, fire and public health associations, governors of 50 states, along with 
FEMA and the DOD.  
The recommended option would restrict the scope of the thesis to a degree that 
would fit within the timelines required for this report by recommending a process to 
create protocols between the California National Guard and law enforcement first 
responders. This would eliminate the problem of involving all 50 states with authority 
over their National Guard resources. It would also deal with the issue in an environment 
in which it would be feasible to subject recommendations to the test of a tabletop 
exercise.  
A meaningful solution requires that operational difficulties between the very 
different command and communication structures used by local and federal emergency 
responders be clarified and fall into general categories. Representatives of the different 
disciplines will need to work together to make recommendations at a level that will 
contribute to the formation of statewide protocols for the application of NIMS in a joint 
                                                 
14 Lt. Col. Scott Jeffrey (NORTHCOM Law Enforcement Liaison), correspondence to author, 
December 10, 2005, 1. 
10 
civil/military effort. Those recommendations should be refined, and guidelines will be 
refined through exposure to an extended group of stakeholders and by application in 
training exercises. Successfully tested guidelines and protocols will potentially contribute 
to the national discussion regarding civil/military coordination during major emergency 
responses. 
The recommended solution would incorporate three specific outcomes. The first 
would be the commissioning of a stakeholder panel under the oversight of the Office of 
Emergency Services. The committee’s mission would be to bring together California 
National Guard and law enforcement participants to review prior experience in mutual 
responses and training and recommend solutions to problems noted. They should also 
discuss future threat scenarios to project what type of pre-planning would benefit law 
enforcement agencies and the National Guard. As a result of these discussions, the final 
outcome of the committee would be to recommend guidelines and protocols to guide 
future National Guard support for law enforcement. 
The second phase of the recommended proposal is to take the guidelines and 
agreements produced by the committee and create a training program to ensure the 
knowledge is passed along to all law enforcement and National Guard personnel qualified 
to work in an Emergency Operations Center or other Incident Command roles. The 
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training would be the 
appropriate training provider. National Guard Liaison Officers and personnel designated 
by law enforcement would be required to complete the training in preparation for future 
exercises. 
The third phase of the recommended proposal would be to reinforce and test the 
training through a series of tabletop or full-scale exercises. The exercises will produce 
experience that may require an updating of the committee guidelines and associated 
training. The exercises will also allow participants to utilize the guidelines in the regional 
environment where they are likely to serve as actual responders and decision makers. 
Finally, the regional interaction will involve the same National Guard and law 
enforcement personnel who will comprise an Emergency Operations team during a   
 
11 
response to an actual terrorist attack or natural disaster. The trust and mutual 
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II. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES: THEORY, AND PRACTICE  
Legal authority for military and especially National Guard support of law 
enforcement is not a topic that can be addressed with absolute certainty. Posse Comitatus 
is a dynamic issue that has been expanded by law, and interpretation is based on the need 
to meet a growing array of threats. The various governing federal laws and amendments 
will be examined in this chapter, along with insight into the reasons for expanding 
Presidential or congressional authority to activate the military. The California Military 
and Veterans Code will also be examined as the governing statute related to the 
California National Guard, because the scope of this thesis is restricted to California. In 
addition, case studies are brought forth as illustrations of the fact that existing legislation 
does not provide solutions to the operational problems created by deploying the 
California National Guard to support law enforcement. 
A. POSSE COMITATUS 
The first step in evaluating the present status of National Guard support of law 
enforcement is to examine the existing federal legislative authority. The United States 
Code limits military assistance to civil authorities to only those circumstances authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress. The power of Congress to authorize an expansion 
of the traditional role of the military, including the National Guard, has led to a growing 
potential for domestic military involvement in response to the national commitment to 
thwart the flow of drugs, combat terrorists, and respond to catastrophic natural disasters. 
Federal military authority and restrictions and the growth of the role of the military in a 
civil support role, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, is evaluated in this section. 
The governing authority regarding military support of civil authority is Title 10 
USC, which is limited by the Posse Comitatus Act, which states, “Whoever, except in 
cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of 
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 
14 
years, or both.”15 The central question that arises from this Act is that Congress has 
allowed for a steadily increasing level of military support, especially for drug 
enforcement. Presidents have used troops to restore domestic order under the insurrection 
provision. Recently, President George W. Bush considered using this provision to use 
National Guard resources to restore order and assist in the rescue and recovery efforts 
after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans.  
B. STAFFORD ACT 
The Stafford Act also gives the President the authority to direct the Department of 
Defense to engage in support of disaster relief. Congressional action regarding the War 
on Terror has also expanded the definition of military support to include response to 
WMD incidents and application of military intelligence related to domestic terrorism, 
thereby greatly expanding the circumstances under which the Stafford Act may be 
invoked. The fact that the Act does not address the Navy, Coast Guard or Marines also 
raises unanswered questions.  
C. EXPANSION OF POSSE COMITATUS AUTHORITY 
The traditional exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act were greatly expanded by a 
provision included in the John W. Warner Defense Appropriation Act of 2006. Jeff Stein, 
editor of CQ.com, details the impact in the following quotes from his article titled “Fine 
Print in Defense Bill Opens Door to Martial Law”:  
Signed by President Bush on Oct. 17, the law (PL 109-364) has a 
provocative provision called “Use of the Armed Forces in Major Public 
Emergencies.” 
The thrust of it seems to be about giving the federal government a far stronger 
hand in coordinating responses to Katrina-like disasters. On closer inspection, its 
language also alters the two-centuries-old Insurrection Act, which Congress passed in 
1807 to limit the President’s power to deploy troops within the United States. That law 
has long allowed the President to mobilize troops only “to suppress, in a State, any 
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.”  
                                                 
15 Charles Doyle, “The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute 
Civilian Law”, Congressional Research Service, November 2000. 1. 
15 
Specifically, the new language adds “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious 
public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident” to the list of conditions permitting 
the President to take over local authority — particularly “if domestic violence has 
occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are 
incapable of maintaining public order.” Since the administration broadened what 
constitutes “conspiracy” in its definition of enemy combatants — anyone who “has 
purposely and materially supported hostilities against the United States,” in the language 
of the Military Commissions Act (PL 109-366) — critics say it’s a formula for executive 
branch mischief.”16 This level of Presidential authority is not universally accepted as 
expressed by this quote in the same article by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., who warned it 
“subverts solid, longstanding posse Comitatus statutes that limit the military’s 
involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it easier for the President to declare 
martial law.”  
D. IMPACT OF POSSE COMITATUS EXPANSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 
The dilemma caused by the evolution of Posse Comitatus is that it requires law 
enforcement and the National Guard to constantly adapt to new responsibilities and 
growing levels of interdependence. The Air Force report on “Military Assistance to Civil 
Authority”17 lists thirty-two separate actions that fall under the Posse Comitatus Act or 
subsequent legislative or presidential actions. Governors from various states voiced a far 
more restrictive view of the military role. Governors by comparison have far greater 
discretion in using National Guard troops under various state statutes. They also have a 
mutual aid compact that facilitates voluntary cooperation between various states. 
The complexity produced by a local response of police, fire and public heath 
authorities is magnified by the introduction of state and federal agencies, making an 
emergency response even more difficult to coordinate. Based on Department of Justice 
statistics, 10% of sheriffs’ offices serving populations over 500,000 do not have written 
plans for responding to terrorist attacks and 60% of sheriffs’ offices serving populations 
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under 25,000 do not have written response plans.18 In some scenarios, the conflict 
between homeland defense and homeland security exists. This brings into question 
jurisdictional issues between the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Homeland Security. If the Federal Emergency Management Agency is elevated to a 
cabinet level agency, as some have proposed, it could bring even one more competing 
agency into the mix. Title 10 and Title 32 of the United States Code gives commander-in-
chief responsibility for the National Guard alternately to the Governors and the President 
depending on the reason for deployment. Major General Timothy Lowenberg points out 
the following conflicts that exist between state and federal authority: 
1. The President has far less authority to deploy federalized National Guard 
troops to assist law enforcement than Governors because of the Posse 
Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). 
2. The President only has the authority to override a Governor regarding 
mobilization of the National Guard under the authority of the War Power 
Clause. 
3. Many states have statutes that prohibit the Governor from using the Guard 
to plan, train, and exercise with other emergency responders. 
4. Many state laws prohibit Governors from accessing the National Guard 
subject matter experts in the absence of actionable intelligence. 
5. National Guard forces serving overseas frequently leave aircraft and 
equipment for replacement forces, leaving their states without those 
resources. 
6. Federal call-out of a National Guard unit deprives the state of personnel 
and equipment for regional emergencies. 
7. Cooperation between states is voluntary and subject to the approval of the 
Governor considering the request. 
8. Both active duty commanders and state Adjutants General believe they 
should retain control of federal troops during domestic emergencies. 
9. The BRAC commission recommendations will leave one-third of states 
without a military air unit and several states without a military aircraft.  
 
Lowenberg summarized the previous concerns by stating, “The United States enters the 
21st Century with unresolved questions about what our national defense and homeland 
security strategies should be. The life and safety of our citizens and the future of our 
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nation hang in the balance. Now, as at the founding of our nation, the states and central 
government must work in harmony to assure our collective safety and security. 
Governors as state commanders-in-chief must take a central role in shaping our national 
policy on use of military force.” 19 
E. POSSE COMITATUS AND MILITARY SUPPORT AFTER 9/11  
The central question that arises from the Posse Comitatus Act, and more so since 
9/11, is that Congress has allowed for a steadily increasing level of military support, 
especially for drug enforcement, and many of these support missions tread closely to law 
enforcement. Presidents have used troops to restore domestic order under the insurrection 
provision. Recently, President George W. Bush used this provision to employ National 
Guard resources to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina 
devastated New Orleans. Specifically, the President ordered in the 82nd Airborne Division 
as a show of force intended to assure local residents that order had been restored, which 
is clearly a law enforcement mission. The Stafford Act also gives the President the 
authority to direct the Department of Defense to engage in support of disaster relief. The 
War on Terror has also expanded the definition of military support to include response to 
WMD incidents and application of military intelligence related to domestic terrorism. 
The dilemma is that, in light of these expanded missions, neither law enforcement nor the 
military is certain about what the military has the authority to do in support of civil 
authorities, or how they will interact. 
The changing nature of conflict and threats has caused some experts to question 
whether existing law is capable of providing clarity to the issue of civil/military 
interaction. Former FEMA Associate Director for Civil Defense Colonel John 
Brinkerhoff summarized his experience as a military and civilian expert in the application 
of Posse Comitatus by writing: “It is time to rescind the existing Posse Comitatus Act and 
replace it with a new law. It leaves plenty of room for people to do unwise and perhaps 
unlawful things while trying to comply with their particular version. It certainly does not 
provide a basis for defining a useful relationship of military forces and civil authority in a 
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global war with terrorism. The Posse Comitatus Act is an artifact of a different conflict 
between freedom and slavery or between North and South, if you prefer. Today’s conflict  
is also in a sense between freedom and slavery, but this time it is between civilization and 
terrorism. New problems often need new solutions, and a new set of rules is needed for 
this issue.”20 
The military role in support of law enforcement encompasses the following 
potential missions:21 
Enemy Attack Insurrection 
Civil Disturbance Earthquake 
Animal Disease Mass Immigration 
Hurricane Volcanic Eruption 
Landslide Biological Incident 
Explosion Radiological Incident 
Snowstorm Drought 
Oil Spill Chemical Incident 
Epidemic Postal Work Stoppage 
State Funerals Counter Terrorism 
Fire Flood 
Tsunami Meteor Impact 
Tornado Space Debris Impact 
Continuity of Government Infrastructure Protection 
Support for Civil Disturbances Support for Law Enforcement 
Support for Civil Authorities Cyber Attack 
Table 1.   Domestic Military Responsibilities 
 
Four civil support roles that require further analysis are: 
1. Drug Interdiction 
The expansion of the specific limits of the Posse Comitatus Act is apparent. With 
a little imagination, additional potential areas could be added to this list. The first focus 
of the research centers on the role of the military in drug interdiction. There is no 
controversy about this role because the Congress has explicitly provided authority. Over 
the past twenty years, the military has provided support in the areas of linguistics, 
communications, cannabis suppression, transportation, surface reconnaissance, aerial 
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reconnaissance, education and leadership development. The FBI recommends that agency 
specific “memorandums of understanding” be used to create a common understanding 
about the military’s role. In peacetime, the Coast Guard has been given civil law 
enforcement powers in keeping with the “War on Drugs”.  
2. Intelligence 
Much of the literature regarding military support focuses on intelligence sharing, 
primarily due to enactment and application of the PATRIOT Act . The FBI is the lead 
federal agency and the conduit for support from military sources. The events of 9/11 
revealed the lack of cooperation between the CIA, FBI, NSA, and the various branches 
and intelligence agencies of the military service. The “War on Terror” requires these 
agencies to not only share and analyze information, but to also actively work with local 
law enforcement through the mechanisms of task forces and fusion centers. 
The PATRIOT Act permits law enforcement to disclose the contents of 
communication or evidence with federal authorities. Federal agencies are also permitted 
to disclose certain information presented to a Grand Jury and other intelligence agencies. 
Other sections authorize avenues of communication. Granting “Secret” and “Top Secret” 
security clearances to local law enforcement agencies in large numbers creates two-way 
interaction and the possibility of effective intelligence sharing through the Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion Centers. The primary control over intelligence 
gathering and sharing is judiciary. The PATRIOT Act requires court approval of 
wiretaps, pen registers requests and traps and trace orders. Congressional oversight and 
the use of sunset provisions create additional protections.  
3. Search and Rescue Operations 
The third topic addressed by the literature is the role of military support in disaster 
rescue and recovery efforts. The Coast Guard was the first federal responder using its air 
power to conduct evacuations during the first critical days following the flooding of New 
Orleans. This has historically been the role of the National Guard at the direction of a 
governor of a state. Hurricane Katrina tested the status quo by facing the President with a 
situation in which Governor Blanco did not order in the Guard for fear of losing local 
control. Another test to established practice was that the magnitude of the event exceeded 
the capacity of the National Guard and required assistance from the active duty military. 
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The support to domestic operations was made more difficult by the need for The Navy 
and Air Force to assist the victims of the Tsunami in Indonesia and the diverting of 
military helicopters from their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq to assist earthquake 
victims in Pakistan. The rescue and recovery mission that has been historically applied 
domestically has now become a tool of foreign policy. 
4. Conducting Domestic Counter-Terrorism 
The fourth topical focus is the role of the military in combating domestic 
terrorism. One of the first examples was the use of military aircraft to attempt to intercept 
the commercial airliners containing the 9/11 suicide bombers. A second application was 
the dispatching of military aircraft over U.S. cities to prevent further attacks. An 
expansion of this focus is the application of military support in the event of a cyber 
attack, which has been acknowledged by some as an act of war because a major cyber 
attack could produce mass destruction. Our transportation, financial and public service 
sectors are vulnerable to a technological attack that could result in a loss of lives and 
tremendous financial resources. The impact of a successful attack, which cripples any of 
these critical sectors, would damage our economy and our ability to defend ourselves 
against further attacks. The military has little expertise in this area and local law 
enforcement would often be better equipped to respond, but such an attack can now be 
federalized. The military can contribute to local law enforcement, which may be better 
equipped to respond, but federal authorities can unilaterally assume the primary role in a 
federal response. For example, they have led the way in hardening cyber connectivity in 
order to keep classified channels and weapons systems secure.  
The literature generally agrees on the accepted roles of military support and the 
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. Although these exceptions emphasize separate 
elements of those exceptions, they are not mutually exclusive. They also hold in common 
that they do not address the coordination that is required to render military support to 
civil authorities. Many of the available literature resources are proprietary to a certain 





F. CALIFORNIA MILITARY AND VETERANS CODE 
The governing authority for the California Military and Veterans Code, is 
explained and expanded on in the California Office of Emergency Services “Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan”.22 That plan specifies the role of the California National 
Guard (CNG) as assisting authority to discharge lawful responsibilities by performing 
tasks which include, but are not limited to, restoration and maintenance of law and order, 
protection of life and property, limited removal of debris, medical evacuation and limited 
medical treatment, search and rescue, emergency communications, and general logistics 
support. Normally, CNG will be placed in support of law enforcement agencies and will 
not usurp or accept the responsibility or authority of civil authorities.  
Military assistance once provided will be terminated at the earliest practical time 
at the restoration of law and order or the resumption of control of local law enforcement. 
In order for the Adjutant General, CNG, to properly evaluate the emergency and the need 
to implement certain procedures that will reduce the reaction time of CNG forces upon 
call-up, it is essential that early and frequent evaluations of the disturbance or condition 
and its potential be made by senior law enforcement officers and forwarded to him 
through the normal Governor's Office of Emergency Services communication channels, 
or directly to the liaison detachment of the Military Department when on the scene. 
Resource availability is dependent on federal deployments and other commitments.  
The Governor, according to policy, may order the CNG to perform military duty 
of every description. The Governor will normally commit the CNG resources in support 
of civil authority, but only upon determination that emergency conditions exist or are 
imminent, that all civil resources reasonably available have been or will be committed, 
that civil authority cannot or will not be able to control the situation, and that military 
assistance is required and has been requested as provided in law.23 CNG resources cannot 
be used in violation of the Economy Act, which requires civilian or commercial resources 
to be sought before considering use of the Guard. Under the provisions of Section 143 of 
the Military and Veterans Code, the Governor may commit CNG resources without a 
request from civil authority only under highly perilous conditions, where local civil 
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authority no longer exists or is unable or unwilling to employ available civil  
resources to control or mitigate the situation.  
CNG in support of local law enforcement will receive and execute broad mission-
type orders of the civil officer in charge, but will at all times remain under the military 
chain of command. The Military and Veterans Code places solely on the military 
commander all decisions regarding tactical direction of troops, kind and extent of force to 
be used, and particular means to be employed to accomplish the objective or goal 
specified by the civil officer in charge.24 
Any request for National Guard resources must be forwarded to the Governor 
through the Governor's Office of Emergency Services. Under the stress of emergency 
conditions, such as the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, local officials have disregarded the full 
utilization of the mutual aid system in requesting CNG assistance. This results in 
unnecessary delays in providing a response. Requests must be directed through the Law 
Enforcement Regional Coordinator to the Governor's Office of Emergency Services to 
ensure that all available manpower has been reasonably committed.  
The Mutual Aid plan states that the CNG will make every effort to respond to the 
scene of an unusual occurrence in the most expeditious manner possible. Some responses 
may require the mobilization of additional personnel that are not on active duty at the 
time of the request. In such cases the CNG will respond initially with liaison personnel 
and upon gubernatorial approval, will expand deployment based on their represented 
assessment of the current situation and its worsening potential. Depending on global and 
statewide commitments at the time, additional CNG field resources can be expected to 
arrive on-scene no later than 24 hours after approval of the initial request. This is an 
important goal because the historic 72-hour response expectation is insufficient in light of 
current threats. 
G. THE PROBLEMS WITH MILITARY PURPOSE 
The literature also points out problems with the doctrine of military purpose. The 
first concern is that a crisis, such as a civil disturbance can be caused or exacerbated by 
military presence. The second concern is that the police are better trained and more 
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appropriately equipped to handle some problems than the military. Having an adequate 
and appropriate police presence should always be the preferred option, with the military 
being a last resort. The third concern is that sometimes an inappropriate police response 
causes a riot requiring military intervention. Appropriate training and responses by local 
law enforcement should be emphasized to reduce the possibility of the need for a military 
response. The common thread was that the police should not use the military as the 
answer to a problem they created because of poor tactics, training or public relations. 
Another warning is that the military should not weaken its ability to conduct its primary 
mission by over committing resources to law enforcement support, especially in a time of 
war. 
H. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
The literature does not address all of the potential issues. It goes into depth 
regarding those areas that are clearly within the provisions of the law. It makes no 
attempt to explore the areas, which may become exceptions, authorized by Congress or 
Presidential action. It does not look at the possibility of allowing command staff to make 
their own decisions based on established protocol in the event of exigent circumstances. 
The research does not anticipate that civil authorities may have to come to the assistance 
of military facilities or personnel in the event of a terrorist attack. It does not deal with 
the evolving chain of command that will flow from civil to military authorities during 
different phases of any response to a domestic attack. Finally, the research does not 
address the lack of compatibility between the military’s command structure under the 
Federal Response Plan and the National Incident Management System utilized by civil 
first responders. 
I. RECENT EXAMPLES AND PRACTICE 
The primary result of research conducted on this topic has been to isolate the 
areas that have yet to be clearly defined by current law or national protocols. The interest 
in this topic arose from the interaction between federal and civil authorities following the 
crash of Alaska Airlines flight 261 off the California coast, which killed 88 people in 
1998. The Ventura County Sheriff’s Department initiated the search and rescue 
operations because it had aircraft and rescue personnel in the area. The recovery and 
investigation phase progressed to a joint operation with the Coast Guard and Navy. The 
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base of operations moved to a Navy base because it afforded privacy and resources. 
Later, the National Transportation Safety Board and FBI took full responsibility for the 
investigation. Operations went smoothly when the rescue and recovery efforts were either  
clearly local or federal. During the transitions between law enforcement and federal 
agencies, it was only positive personal relationships that guided the participants through 
the unclear chain of command issues. 
The second incident that focused on the same issue was a training exercise 
conducted through the coordination of the Center for Asymmetric Warfare. The exercise 
involved local and federal law enforcement working with the Navy in coping with a 
simulated attack on a Navy base using a cargo ship containing a dirty bomb. The 
specialized units performed as expected and the tactical operations were conducted with 
precision. The confusion was limited to the command post. Different management 
systems, communications, definitions and understanding of chain of command kept the 
command staff adjusting and moving awkwardly through the exercise. Although 
technology, terminology and equipment were problematic, the basis for the difficulties 
was the lack of understanding of each other’s chains of command and systems for 
emergency response. 
An interview with the law enforcement commander of the exercise provided an 
example of the issues that surfaced during this research. The law enforcement decision 
makers were all trained in the application of the State Emergency Management System, 
which closely approximates the National Incident Management System. It was part of 
their culture and a common link between all responding state and local agencies. The 
terminology was consistent and participants had been trained in their roles within the 
system, which was reinforced by practical experience. However, the military participants 
operated under a different system and the law enforcement representatives were never 
briefed on its operation. Law enforcement also did not have direct communication with 
military tactical units. Although there was a nominal unified command, law enforcement 
leaders were not routinely briefed regarding the status of military operations. When a 
decision needed to be made quickly, they did not understand the military’s process for 
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receiving their authorization for action. They were also frustrated by the delay in 
receiving authorization for military assistance when immediate action was required. 
The expectation was that the research associated with this project might shed light 
on best practices to improve coordination between law enforcement and the military 
during a terrorist response or catastrophic natural disaster. While model practices were 
not discovered, the research certainly indicates that there is an unmet need in California 
and in other parts of the country, for an integrated approach to maximizing the use of 
local and military resources. In the next chapter, the focus will be National Guard, 
federal, or active duty military deployments that provide lessons learned related to 
National Guard support of local law enforcement.  
J. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The literature reveals that authority for the military to conduct domestic missions 
was restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act to prevent the military from becoming a 
political tool that could endanger the civil liberties and our constitutional democracy. The 
Act provided that Congress could amend Constitutional limitations in order to provide 
flexibility for unforeseen threats. Since that time, the Insurrection Act, Stafford Act, and 
Warner Defense Appropriations Act have allowed the use of the military to keep the 
peace, combat drugs, deal with terrorist threats or attacks, conduct search and rescue 
operations, provide intelligence and respond to natural disasters. These changes have 
caused rapid adaptation for both law enforcement and the National Guard. These 
expanding military responsibilities have created uncertainties about the relationship 
between the National Guard and local law enforcement. The National Incident 
Management System was adopted to define the role of the military and other federal 
agencies in the event of terrorist attacks or natural disasters, but NIMS does not deal with 
operational issues such as communications, logistics, Unified Command, or the 
difference between military and law enforcement command and control. 
After action reports were also analyzed to determine what practical issues arise 
when the National Guard is involved in a major response to support law enforcement. 
The scope of this thesis is California and the most contemporary example of a major 
National Guard response to law enforcement was the 1992 Los Angeles Riot. The 
military response was delayed by planning and logistic failures. The numerical response 
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was far more than needed, because law enforcement did not understand National Guard 
capabilities. Law enforcement was unsure of how to use National Guard assets 
effectively. Communications was ineffective and coordination was lacking. These and 
other problems were also experienced in the National Guard response to the flooding in 
New Orleans. Other exercises and federal responses confirm that these problems are 
likely to occur in any large military response to aid civilian authorities. 
The third lesson learned from the research is that it is possible to create an 
environment in which the National Guard and law enforcement plan and problem solve 
cooperatively on a regular basis. An example is the Illinois Terrorism Task Force that 
pre-dates the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Illinois National Guard is co-located with state 
law enforcement personnel and participates with the Task Force in planning efforts 
monthly with the entire state law enforcement community. When a large law enforcement 
and National Guard deployment was ordered to assist civil authorities in Louisiana, the 
prior planning and interaction that existed because of their prior experience resulted in a 
rapid and efficient response. California does not have a state Task Force or a forum for 
law enforcement interaction with the National Guard. 
Finally a review of the California Law Enforcement Mutual Plan demonstrates 
that the authority of the Governor, the National Guard and civil authorities are clearly 
defined, but other critical operational issues are not discussed. It is encouraging to see 
that the National Guard is committed to providing a representative to evaluate the need 
for their assets quickly and follow up with a deployment within 24 hours. Practically 
speaking, logistics prevent support from any sources other than regional law enforcement 
agencies in less than 24 hours. After a couple of shifts, law enforcement mutual aid can 
begin to be depleted and that is when National Guard assistance is most needed. 
An example of a potential problem in the plan is that the military commander is 
solely responsible for deciding what means or degree of force the National Guard will use 
to accomplish the mission delegated by law enforcement authorities. The authority is 
certainly understandable if the military is defending their personnel or protecting the lives 
of others. The concern becomes whether law enforcement or political authorities would 
be hesitant to delegate some missions, particularly if they had no understanding of the 
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means of force that would be used. Historically, National Guard units have functioned 
under the operations section’s military branch within the Incident Command structure, 
and have not had direct organizational ties to law enforcement decision makers. An 
example of this occurred when the Governor of Louisiana approved the unqualified use 
of force to control looting in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Local elected 
officials and law enforcement agencies would have had serious concerns if they felt the 
National Guard was going to take lives to protect property. This illustrates the importance 
of planning and prior agreements between law enforcement and the National Guard to 
agree on rules of engagement and other operational issues that might arise in a major 
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 III. LESSONS LEARNED APPLICABLE TO NATIONAL GUARD 
SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The most contemporary example of a major deployment of the California 
National Guard to assist law enforcement during a major emergency is the response to the 
Los Angeles Riots in 1992. The CNG also had a smaller deployment in the aftermath of 
the Northridge earthquake in 1994, but the scale and nature of that mission does not 
compare with the complexity of the 1992 LA Riots. Comparing present day operations to 
the Los Angeles Riots has limitations as the deployment occurred almost 15 years ago. 
The riots did not take place in a post 9/11 world, nor did they come in a period during 
which the National Guard was heavily committed overseas. Although the CNG has been 
deployed to provide security at airports and to reinforce the border, these deployments 
were in support of federal agencies and not local law enforcement. In light of the lack of 
contemporary experience with a major CNG deployment in support of local law 
enforcement, other comparisons can at least shed light on experience with support for the 
National Guard in other states and the active duty military, such as the assistance 
provided in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The serious examination of the military 
and law enforcement performance provides insight that applies to an examination of law 
enforcement and military responders in California. 
Another perspective can be provided by examining exercises in California that 
include interaction between military and law enforcement assets to address a terrorist 
threat or attack. The Center for Asymmetric Warfare exercise provides a valuable 
illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of a joint law enforcement/National Guard 
response. Finally, an examination of the emergency models of other jurisdictions can be 
enlightening from the aspect of comparing working structures and their successes and 
failures. The State of Illinois Joint Terrorism Task Force was selected because it was 
formed in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. This organization pre-dates most 
other states and creates an active interaction between law enforcement and the Illinois 
National Guard. This structure demonstrated a notable success in providing a coordinated 
response to Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina.  
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A. 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOT  
The California National Guard has had more recent limited or federal 
deployments, but none have the same characteristics as the Los Angeles Riots of 1992. In 
the past five years, the National Guard has been called to provide additional security to 
airports on two occasions in support of the Transportation Safety Administration. The 
Guard has also been deployed to the Mexican border to supplement the efforts of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
While these were major deployments, neither was in support of local law 
enforcement authorities. There have also been many small deployments of select units 
that did not reach a high enough magnitude to provide valuable lessons for a future major 
event. The Los Angeles Riot in contrast was an incident involving law enforcement 
mutual aid, the National Guard, and later a federal joint task force. It serves as the only 
applicable test of the type of interaction that could be expected in the event of a major 
terrorist attack or catastrophic natural disaster in California, such as an earthquake, wild 
land fire, or tsunami.  
Chief Charles Simpson of the Office of Emergency services confirmed that the 
1992 Los Angeles Riots remains the only large-scale deployment of the California 
National Guard to local authorities in decades and, other than exercises, is still the most 
appropriate case study in his view. The event was fully analyzed after action-reports 
completed by the California National Guard and Highway Patrol. Chief Simpson also 
referenced an operational checklist for Civil Unrest/Disorder that was produced following 
the riots with the consultation of the sheriffs who were Mutual Aid Coordinators. This 
document contains the specificity and checklists that would be helpful for all potential 
hazards and threats, but are not in common distribution or part of required training.25  
Christopher Schnaubelt, in his “Parameters” article titled Lessons in Command 
and Control from the Los Angeles Riots, pointed out many problems that the armed 
services have with assisting local authorities in operations other than war (OOTW). 
While progress has certainly been made since the inception of USNORTHCOM, it is also 
apparent that many of the same practical difficulties would be encountered today in the 
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event of an immediate and large-scale military deployment to a major terrorist attack or 
natural catastrophe. The author considers the 1992 Los Angeles Riot an illustration of 
how a military mission can be vague and uncertain because of the nature of the event and 
the impact of political considerations. The uncertainty of command when dealing with 
multiple jurisdictions and politicians at various levels competes with the military tenet of 
Unity of Command.  
The Los Angeles riot was the most destructive civil disturbance in American 
history. Fifty-four people lost their lives and property damage exceeded $800,000,000. At 
the height of the deployment 10,000 California National Guard troops and 3,500 active 
duty soldiers and Marines participated.26 The size and duration of the military support 
effort makes this event one of the best tests of law enforcement/military joint command 
and control. The fact that there was a hostile force in a large urban environment again 
presents a more realistic comparison to a terrorist event than a natural disaster. 
Some of the lessons learned from the response to the Los Angeles Riots and 
Hurricane Katrina were reflected in the clarification of the military’s role in the 1993 
publications “Department of Defense FM 100-5 Operations” and “Domestic Support 
Operations.” Some of the problems identified are also consistent with deficiencies 
experienced in actual deployments and training exercises in the post 9/11 environment. 
The first failures noted were the initial response to the riot by the LAPD. All of 
their senior leadership was out of the county at a training meeting, even though hostilities 
could have been anticipated when the court verdicts regarding the Rodney King beating 
were announced. The Chief of the LAPD, Daryl Gates was at a political fund-raiser when 
violence broke out and also was not on speaking terms with Mayor William Bradley. 
This relationship contributed to the ineffective response to the initial violence, which was 
captured on national television as a motorist was dragged from his vehicle and beaten 
severely for several minutes with no police response. 
The experiences of the 1992 L.A. Riots could be repeated in any major terrorist 
event. Local law enforcement can be quickly overwhelmed. Politicians can be expected 
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to generate unwarranted requests in order to display leadership. Competing requests will 
be made for military resources. The mission will be unclear and changing. The following 
is a summary of issues identified that could very well have present day application: 
1. The National Guard leadership did not have a reliable deployment 
timetable to help local law enforcement plan with their tactical planning. 
2. The Los Angeles Police Department failed to use the law enforcement 
mutual aid agreements that they had in place. 
3. Law enforcement did not know where to deploy the troops or in some 
cases what mission to assign them. 
4. Civilian and military leaders assumed that the National Guard or the 
standing military would never be required to restore order in an American 
city. As a result, civilian and military emergency plans did not include that 
contingency. 
5. The National Guard’s civil disturbance plan and training only considered 
the use of their modest Military Police Brigade. The infantry battalions 
would provide additional support if needed, but they received no training 
and were not included in the operational plans. 
6. The police mutual aid doctrine created the expectation that by the time all 
available law enforcement resources were exhausted enough time would 
have passed for the situation to have de-escalated to the point that the 
military would not be necessary. This assumption did not consider the 
political reality of elected officials from Los Angeles, Sacramento and 
Washington D.C. responding to live television coverage with overlapping, 
and uncoordinated, requests. 
7. The LAPD’s size and culture of independence made it difficult for them to 
admit they needed help from outside police agencies, much less the 
military. Chief Gates was quoted as saying he did not want to, “Take 
orders from a general.”27 
8. The “Stomp and Drag”28 tactics that the National Guard and active 
military were trained in were inappropriate for the threat and never used. 
9. Communications regarding the timing of the deployment were unclear and 
resulted in a sizeable gap between when law enforcement expected 
military support and when it arrived. 
10. The failure to plan for the command and logistics required for a sizeable 
military response to a civil disturbance created prolonged and avoidable 
delays. 
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11. Few troops had received civil disturbance training in the last year and 
most did not have riot batons or shields. Their weapons were not locked to 
prevent full automatic fire. 
12. There was no plan for the deployment of centralized munitions and 
soldiers were deployed without ammunition in dangerous areas. 
13. Military and law enforcement forces had not trained together for this 
contingency. 
14. The Emergency Operations Center, manned by the L.A. Sheriff’s 
Department was designated as the location where requests for support 
would be made and approved. The LAPD chose to ignore this single 
source plan and made independent requests directly to the military. This 
made prioritization impossible for both law enforcement and the National 
Guard. 
15. The number of troops requested through the Emergency Operations Center 
and the LAPD differed greatly and led to confusion as to the actual need 
for deployment. 
16. The California Highway Patrol, which should have been deployed before 
the military, was not engaged until after the military response. 
17. When field commanders began coupling a law enforcement commander 
with a National Guard commander at the division level, coordination 
greatly improved. 
18. By the time the Joint Task Force was organized the riots were essentially 
over. 
19. The President federalized the National Guard but they were not directly 
notified of the change in command until the next morning. 
20. Before federalization and the establishment of the Joint Task Force nearly 
100% of requests for support were granted. After the JTF was given 
authority to grant requests, the approval ratio was reduced to 20%. Much 
of the difference was related to the greater utility of the National Guard 
when it was under state control. The time for approval also increased to 6-
8 hours. 
21. The Joint Task Force disengaged without notice or transition leaving law 
enforcement completely unprepared to assume command. 
 
Governor Pete Wilson also commissioned a report on the National Guard 
response. The report included the input of all major stakeholders including the Office of 
Emergency Services, California National Guard, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and 
Los Angeles Police Department. The report concluded that the National Guard was not 
properly equipped or trained for the mission and law enforcement needed to learn how to 
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pre-determine missions before requesting assistance. The report’s observations conclude 
with the statement, “The military maxim that ‘we fight as we have trained’ applies to 
crisis management of emergencies.”29 While the CNG conducted a follow-up training 
exercise titled Angel Gate 93 to improve their response interaction with law enforcement, 
the effort only emphasized a joint effort with LAPD and LASO. The CNG additional 
planning resulted in an improved performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
response. 
During the last fifteen years, the lessons learned from the LA Riots have lost 
much of their value. The Governor’s Commission recommendations still provide a solid 
roadmap to preparing for future joint civilian/military operations in California. In 
summary, the initial evaluation and subsequent training needs to be frequently repeated. 
The problems that contributed to a lack of coordination between law enforcement and the 
California National Guard need to be corrected. Common guidelines need to be 
established and statewide training must be conducted. One of goals of this project is to 
move both law enforcement and the CNG toward a process that will provide written 
guidelines and training that will ensure effective performance in future joint responses. 
B. HURRICANE KATRINA 
Hurricane Katrina is the “costliest natural disaster ever to strike the United States. 
Risk management experts estimate that the storm resulted in $40-$60 billion in insured 
loses, while actual loses likely will exceed $150 billion. In terms of human costs, the 
effects of Katrina will be felt for decades.”30 This is not a California scenario, but it does 
provide a modern example of local, state, National Guard and federal joint operations in a 
stressful environment. Local law enforcement was completely overwhelmed and in many 
cases unable to respond or restore order. Looting and violence prevailed and lack of 
planning and coordination hampered the efforts of mutual aid responders to render 
assistance. In addition, a dysfunctional political atmosphere and lack of local and state 
leadership contributed to the slow and ineffective emergency response. 
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A summary of the many after action reports on the response to Hurricane Katrina 
reveals that there were a multitude of identified problems and lessons observed in various 
response and recovery components. The following items have a direct bearing on 
elements of a joint response that are applicable to efforts to coordinate the California 
National Guard’s ability to respond to local authorities, and are relevant to the scope of 
this project. 
1. Command and Control were Impaired at All Levels, Delaying Relief 
Communications needed to be more seamless, both within law enforcement and 
with the National Guard and other responding agencies. An associated problem was that 
inadequate personnel, training, and funding were available to carry out the work of 
command and control. In some areas of Louisiana there was “no pre-existing unified 
system of command and control at all.”31 In areas of Mississippi command and control 
was ceded to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for several weeks. 
2. Coordination between Law Enforcement and the Military was 
Lacking 
The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex, as written, 
contributes to delay in the active duty military response. The Department of Defense 
(DOD) and FEMA also need to coordinate more effectively. DOD needs to incorporate 
lessons learned during joint exercises with civil authorities. All of these factors 
contributed to the coordination problems between the military and law enforcement. 
National Guard and active duty forces need to integrate more effectively to 
provide a more cohesive military response. USNORTHCOM needs more adequate 
insight into state response capabilities. Even successful Search and Rescue efforts can 
benefit from coordination and integration between various military organizations and law 
enforcement resources. Both of these were areas of failure during Katrina.  
Legislators and the academic community critiqued the police response to 
Hurricane Katrina during congressional hearings.32 The magnitude of the event could 
provide valuable lessons that should be considered by jurisdictions planning for a major 
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terrorist attack. In the case of New Orleans, over 300 officers had to be rescued before 
other search and rescue efforts could be attempted; sixty officers resigned; forty-five 
were fired; thirteen were investigated for looting; and, 70% were homeless. Furthermore, 
police communications failed for the first 80 hours; many of their vehicles were flooded; 
plans were not well understood or available, and they had never planned or trained for 
some of the contingencies. They suffered from lack of planning, corruption and 
inefficient leadership. Their failures were highlighted by the fact that they were 
confronted with a foreseeable event. 
Although the size and scope of the event invites the question of whether even the 
best trained and equipped department could have performed better, the same report 
provides the answer. Neighboring Plaqeumines Parish relied on their plans to save their 
entire patrol fleet by moving it to higher ground. They also evacuated all of their 
administrative records and prisoners in advance of the storm. The sheriff’s effective plan 
allowed them to immediately devote their full efforts to search and rescue functions.33 
Professor Herman Leonard and Dr. Arnold Howitt of the Harvard Business 
School offered additional observations and recommendations in their report titled 
“Katrina as Prelude.”34 The first sobering reality posed by the authors is that the United 
States is not, and has never been, capable of responding to an event of this magnitude. 
The second point is that FEMA was never designed, resourced or authorized to lead a 
response effort of this size and scope, despite what the public and some elected officials 
believe. 
A report by the University of South Carolina summarized all of the available data 
and synthesized them into eight highlighted recommendations for law enforcement. The 
following recommendations send a clear message to California and other states lacking a 
pre-planned understanding of command and control in major multi-jurisdictional  
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responses, especially when they entail military resources. The following 
recommendations are listed because they reflect the problem areas most clearly identified 
in the University report: 
1. The first priority should be to prevent and mitigate damage before the 
event occurs. 
2. The Incident Management System needs to progress beyond a plan to a 
paradigm for action. 
3. First responders should be qualified through a system of training and 
experience. 
4. The level of advance planning and practice for a coordinated response 
should be dramatically improved. 
5. Agreements for political communication and decision-making are needed. 
6. The capacity to communicate and “lean-forward” should be sharpened.  
7. Local government needs advance planning with private organizations. 
8. DHS needs to become an excellent organization with expanded 
capabilities and resources. 
 
These findings were summarized by the researchers with the following statement 
that emphasizes the type of pre-planning that could have prevented many of the problems 
experienced during the Los Angeles Riots of 1992: 
Major disasters require pre-planned lines of command and control to 
coordinate the response of multiple public safety agencies, including those 
from out of state.35 
The results of these reports have several applications to this thesis, despite the fact 
that the National Guard of the State of Louisiana, and later active military units, were the 
primary federal resources interacting with the New Orleans Police Department and the 
Louisiana State Police. Command and control was impaired by a lack of coordination, as 
it was during the Los Angeles Riot. Coordination with the military was lacking, as it was 
in the 1992 response to assist the LAPD. There was a lack of understanding of military 
capabilities that still exists between law enforcement and the California National Guard. 
Finally, the process for requesting active duty military resources is lengthy and not  
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clearly understood by civil authorities. The flaws that were revealed during the response 
to Hurricane Katrina can certainly occur in California if planning, communications and 
training are not improved. 
C. 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS  
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon have been the 
subject of reports, books, movies, and after action reports by every involved branch of 
government. The enormous first responder capabilities in New York do not make it the 
best predictor of military or federal support of law enforcement in other jurisdictions, but 
there are still valuable lessons to learn. 
Although a review of each report on the topic is useful, FEMA produced a 
crosscutting analysis of the nine major post-9/11 reports to group key recommendations 
that were common to a majority of reports.36 The following recommendations have 
relevance to the subject of law enforcement /military cooperation. Recommendations not 
applicable to the topic of this thesis are not included. 
1. Command and Control 
Full utilization of an Incident Command System should be used to coordinate a 
major multiple agency response. Federal agencies should also integrate their command 
systems into the state and local ICS. 
2. Communications 
Interoperable communications are important for local, state and federal agencies, 
as well as standardized protocols, standards, and procedures. 
3. Coordination 
Five of the nine reports reviewed by FEMA called for improved coordination 
across all levels of government, including an interagency plan and improved 
communication flow from local and state to federal agencies. The plan should include 
resource management, equipment caches, and be the subject of training and exercises.  
4. Mutual Aid 
Mutual aid agreements are needed across all levels of first responders, including 
joint training and exercises for local, state, and federal agencies that focus on 
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preparedness, response operations and interoperable equipment. This recommendation 
directly reinforces the need for pre-planning for military support in California. 
D. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE INITIATIVE EXERCISE 2003 (AWI-03) 
Terrorist events and natural disasters start as local events that often result in a 
request for military assistance. Such an event could involve overlapping jurisdictional 
authority or even evolve from local, to federal and then transition back to local authority. 
The AWI-03 exercise in Ventura County provides lessons observed that directly apply to 
the interaction of law enforcement and the California National Guard. The AWI-03 
exercise that was conducted at the Port Hueneme Naval Base and the adjoining civilian 
port included a threat of a dirty bomb set off by insurgent stowaways. The impact of the 
explosion in the scenario affected both civilian communities and connected military 
bases. 
Paul Grossgold served as the Captain of the Naval Construction Battalion Base at 
Port Hueneme at the time of the AWI-03 training exercise in 2003. He said his staff had 
discussed the possibility of responding to local events at the request of USNORTHCOM. 
His responsibilities in that scenario were clear unless the response was required before 
formal tasking had occurred. Captain Grossgold stated, “It was my guidance (to his staff) 
that if the need was clearly there, I would not wait to respond. I’d rather be reprimanded 
for acting too soon than keep potentially life-saving assets standing idle.” 37  
The Captain observed that law enforcement had an important responsibility to 
define the military’s civil mission, establish a clear civilian chain of command, and have 
a plan to escalate the response as needed. As a result of the exercise, the Captain also 
recognized he needed a larger commitment to the joint EOC than his initial representative 
and redeployed personnel from the base EOC. He felt communications after that 
adjustment were adequate.  
Ed Beakley, an exercise designer for the Battelle group, was also interviewed 
because of his involvement with training that encompassed the response of both local 
authorities and the military. Mr. Beakley felt that the exercise demonstrated that the 
greatest need for improvement was in the understanding by all parties of the resources, 
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limitations and expectations of the agencies they would be working with in a mutual aid 
disaster.38 Mr. Beakley also observed that the understanding of roles within an Incident 
Command environment was a serious problem, because of the military’s background in 
“Unity of Command” compared to the “Unified Command” commonly used in large 
responses by civilian authorities. Based on his observation and experience, he felt that the 
first priority of integration between civil authorities and the military should be the 
National Guard, since they are the first military responders to most domestic threats. He 
emphasized that collaboration; communication and active participation in a unified 
command would take pre-planning, training and exercises to become operationally 
beneficial.  
E. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ILLINOIS TERRORISM TASK FORCE 
California’s short-lived State Committee on Terrorism can be compared with the 
Illinois Terrorism Task Force, which was created in 1998 as a response to the terrorist 
bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. This Task Force reports directly to the 
Governor’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Public Safety. It recommends to the Governor a 
strategy for terrorism preparedness. The Task Force members vote on budget priorities 
for DHS grant funds and make statutory, operational and training recommendations to the 
Governor. The Task Force also acts as the purchasing agent for grant-funded equipment, 
insuring standardization throughout Illinois. Given the difficulty in coordinating the 
1,800 law enforcement agencies in the state, the Task Force has made significant gains by 
bringing together over 800 of the larger agencies representing the large majority of state 
officers.39 
The Task Force is comprised of the following fifteen working committees 
representing all sectors of government and the private sector that are stakeholders in 
planning or preparing for terrorist attacks. These committees have broad representation 
and propose budget priorities, training, and statutory changes relevant to their specialty. 
The active I.T.T.F. committees are: 
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Crisis Response and Prevention 
Elected Officials 
Emergency Management 
Fire Service Mutual Aid 
Information Technology 
Law Enforcement Mutual Aid 
Private Sector 
Public Information 
Science and Technology 
Training 
Transportation 
Urban Area Initiative 
Volunteers / Citizen’s Corp 
Table 2.   Illinois Terrorism Task Force Committees 
 
The active nature of this Task Force, in addition to the large degree of 
participation and inclusion created by their active committee process, has served to 
improve communication between the state and local agencies and created a sense of 
teamwork. The State of Illinois’ response to an EMAC request to respond to Louisiana in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrates their success.40 Illinois was able to dispatch 
over 900 firefighters, 200 pieces of fire apparatus, 300 police officers, management and 
support personnel from over 300 police and fire departments under a single command, 
and operating as one department with compatible communications. These forces were 
joined by 1,000 National Guard troops. In addition to disaster response, the Task Force 
has also created eight Special Response Units capable of assisting with a variety of 
threats from SWAT operations to WMD responses, within their state and beyond.41 
It is surprising that Illinois does not have a sub-committee on civil/military 
cooperation, but the active involvement of the National Guard on other committees does 
create a forum for frequent interaction and planning. The Law Enforcement Mutual Aid 
committee would be an appropriate forum for conducting pre-planning for military 
support of law enforcement. While this organization has not produced specific responses, 
it is a model of a structure that facilitates interaction and personal relationships and 
problem-solving between law enforcement and military responders, which creates a 
strong foundation on which to rely on, in the event of an actual joint response. 
In conclusion, we can learn valuable lessons about how to prepare for a major 
deployment of the California National Guard from a review of the 1992 Los Angeles 
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Riot. It was not in a wartime environment, but the magnitude of the event certainly 
provides parallels to a potential terrorist event. The event quickly exceeded law 
enforcement capabilities. It disrupted transportation and vital elements of the 
infrastructure. The riot included a large response area with a dangerous adversary. It 
created a joint operation between organizations that had little previous history. None of 
the involved agencies had plans for this type of event and had not trained together. 
Political interference became a major and unanticipated complication. The differences in 
culture, communications, expectations, operational protocols and terminology between 
law enforcement and the National Guard caused significant delays in response that 
contributed to casualties and property loss. 
The National Guard response in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated 
that command and control differences and communications problems are problematic 
when law enforcement receives military support. A lack of effective integration 
hampered coordination of law enforcement and military resources. Although the National 
Guard did not play a major role, the response of federal agencies to the 9/11 attack on the 
World Trade Center again pointed to problems in command and control, communications 
and coordination, which could have been remedied by prior mutual aid agreements. 
The lessons learned from the after-action reports related to these major joint 
responses could have been largely addressed by prior agreements, plans, guidelines, 
training and exercises. In attempting to find a best practice, the Illinois Terrorism Task 
Force was reviewed because of their success in marshaling major law enforcement, 
National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina. While they do not have specific 
guidelines for National Guard support, they do create a structure that promotes 
interaction and joint problem solving involving law enforcement and National Guard 
representatives. The history, trust, and collaborative experience built in this environment 
allowed them to react quickly and cooperatively during a crisis. 
The next chapter will evaluate the environment in which change needs to occur. It 
will also apply the “Strategy Canvas” and “Four Actions Framework” models to the 
available information. Finally, a summary of the acceptance potential of the critical 
stakeholders will be presented in preparation for identifying specific options for change. 
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IV. POLICY OPTION ANALYSIS FOR IMPROVING NATIONAL 
GUARD SUPPORT TO CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In order to create a strategic plan to address the lack of common planning, 
protocols and training between California law enforcement and the National Guard, 
elements and techniques of the Blue Ocean Strategy as described by authors W. Chan 
Kim and Renee Maubourge will be applied.42 In this groundbreaking book, the authors 
point out that the hurdles to executing change in an organization are: cognitive, resources, 
motivation and politics.43 This thesis utilizes the strategy because it has been an effective 
change agent in public and private organizations in need of change in emerging threat and 
opportunity environments. The War on Terror certainly creates uncharted territory for 
civil authorities anticipating a reliance on National Guard support. As a result of these 
features, the Blue Ocean Strategy has been used as one of the primary strategic planning 
methodologies by the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, located at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
The first element of this approach is to create uncontested market space. In the 
terminology of the authors this refers to providing a distinctive solution to a problem that 
has not been addressed by other sectors of the industry. From a Homeland Security 
perspective, statewide guidelines and adequate pre-planning for a major CNG response to 
assist law enforcement are such uncontested needs. The author’s research failed to 
identify a California county or another state that has a comprehensive operational plan for 
integrating National Guard and law enforcement resources. The second element of the 
strategy is to make the competition irrelevant. In this case, there is no competition except 
those forces that would use violence within our borders. Producing a more effective 
response requires more collaboration than competition. The third element is capturing a 
new demand. In the aftermath of the unsatisfactory joint response to Hurricane Katrina, 
emergency responders, government agencies, and the public have a strong interest in 
being better prepared for the next event. Recommendations derived from this study will 
                                                 
42 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, Harvard Business School Press, Boston 
Massachusetts, 2005, 23-184. 
43 Ibid., 147-148. 
44 
have an excellent opportunity to benefit from this demand. The final element is breaking 
the cost-value trade off. The proposals produced by this project result in value that far 
outstrip the modest cost of implementation. 
A. STRATEGY CANVAS 
A Strategy Canvas is simply a analysis of the competitive environment in which 
the proposed change will occur. The first stage of this analytical tool is an appraisal of 
how similar components from the same industry perform. It is difficult to graph the 
performance of the fifty states in regard to integrating law enforcement and National 
Guard resources because no state surveyed responded that they have a specific plan to 
apply the National Incident Management System to the practical realities of a multi-
jurisdictional response, including their National Guard. When considering just California 
counties or mutual aid regions, surveys again did not reveal any specific regional 
agreements between law enforcement and the National Guard. While these results are not 
helpful in terms of graphing differences, they do demonstrate that exploration of this 
topic occurs in an uncontested environment. 
A new value will need to be identified to support change. In this case that value is 
the creation of a coordinated emergency response structure that utilizes protocols, 
guidelines, training, exercises, and agreements to anticipate the requirements of all-
hazards mutual aid involving local, state, military authorities and the public. This is a 
“Blue Ocean” environment because no other state has been found to have a written 
document expressing operational agreements between the National Guard, the Offices of 
Homeland Security and Emergency services, and the principle local emergency response 
stakeholders. 
1. Goal  
To create a body of statewide protocols, training requirements, and personal 
interaction that will standardize the command and control interactions between National 
Guard personnel while responding to assist civil authorities during catastrophic natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks in California. 
2. Importance  
The example of disorganized responses to Hurricane Katrina and the Los Angeles 
Riots of 1992 make it evident that the various levels of government still do not have clear 
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operational direction, beyond the jurisdictional guidelines of NIMS, to guide their 
interaction. There have been enough problems created by a lack of standardized 
protocols, training, and communications to make it imperative that California creates a 
universally accepted set of standards for law enforcement and National Guard responses. 
The proposed standardization of expectations, protocols and training would logically 
reduce casualties and property loss in the event of a major terrorist attack or natural 
disaster. 
3. Environmental Scan  
Discussions with 58 California sheriffs and mutual aid coordinators reveal a lack 
of communication and understanding between law enforcement and their state and 
federal partners. A review of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the Los Angeles 
Riots of 1992 and the AWI-03 training exercise confirms that command control, 
communications and role definition are problems that impair joint agency emergency 
responses due to delays in bringing together resources which address threats to lives and 
property. Conversations with federal and state military authorities confirm that the same 
uncertainty exists regarding the law enforcement role and expectations. 
4. New Programs  
The first recommendation will be to create a stakeholder committee to oversee 
regularly scheduled meetings to produce a written set of objectives including the creation 
of a standardized approach to multi-jurisdictional emergency responses. The second 
recommendation will be that the Governor commission a panel of subject matter experts 
from each of the primary emergency response stakeholders to design a set of protocols 
and checklists to cover each of the threat scenarios addressed in the National Response 
Plan. The third program priority will be regularly scheduled command and control 
exercises in each mutual aid region to test the quality of civil/military interaction in 
applying the protocols. The fourth program enhancement will be the production of 
capability inventories for local, state and federal authorities. 
5. So What?  
It is not an exaggeration to state that efficient interaction between responders at 
all levels is a matter of life and death. It is the prime standard by which citizens evaluate 
their government, because there is no greater mission than the protection of human life 
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and property. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that our ability to respond across state and 
federal boundaries in keeping with the public’s expectation is lacking. Americans 
certainly have a right to expect that we will learn from the mistakes of the past and be 
ready for the challenges of the future. A standardized approach to National Guard 
assistance to law enforcement will reduce unnecessary delays in joint responses in 
addition to contribution to full utilization of resources.  
The following figure reflects a subjective projection of the impact of the proposed 
changes based on research and interviews. Principle stakeholders were asked to provide 
an appraisal of the current status of preparation and then estimate the change that would 
occur if the proposed process of adopting guidelines, supported by training and exercises 
was implemented. The following graph reflects their responses. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas: National Guard Support to Law Enforcement. 
 
B. FOUR ACTIONS FRAMEWORK 
Using the “Four Actions Framework”44 introduced in the Blue Ocean Strategy, 
the strategic priorities can be described in a structured format focusing on elements to be 
eliminated, reduced, created, or raised to achieve the goal. This systematic approach 
requires reducing change to basic and identifiable elements. 
                                                 




Figure 2.   Four Action Framework 
 
1. Eliminate 
Great emphasis has been placed by law enforcement on DHS grant driven 
priorities, which do not necessarily improve coordination between law enforcement and 
the National Guard. The lack of standardized guidelines for California National Guard 
creates confusion regarding responsibilities that do not promote an effective Incident 
Command operation. This amplifies the understandable discomfort caused by the fact that 
the military and law enforcement have differences in terminology, lines of authority and 
operational priorities. 
Major law enforcement operations have a single-agency focus or a regional multi-
agency Unified Command. Neither organizational format frequently involves National 
Guard support. When the National Guard and other military units are utilized they are 
relegated to the military unit of the operations branch. That means they are far removed 
from providing input, or having insight into the decision making process. Creating 
common guidelines, training and exercises should eliminate confusion in future joint 
operations. 
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The third problem targeted for elimination is the unnecessary duplication of effort 
that occurs when law enforcement and the military operate without effective 
communication, interaction, or common experience based on prior exercises. 
2. Reduce 
Expense caused by dispatching excessive resources to mutual aid requests based 
on lack of understanding by the requesting agency can be reduced. The 1992 Los Angeles 
Riot is an example of an over commitment of the National Guard based on political 
priorities and a lack of understanding of mission capabilities. Pre-planning and exercises 
can provide law enforcement leaders and political representatives with realistic estimates 
of National Guard capabilities. 
Time required for appropriate state and federal resources to be deployed in 
useable quantities can also be reduced. During the 1992 Los Angeles Riot, useful 
deployments were delayed because troops were sent without ammunition and the 
logistics to move the ammunition were not thought out. Prior planning and training could 
reduce the possibility of these oversights.  
The most important reduction that can be achieved is in the loss of lives and 
property. Time lost and money wasted predictably results in a less effective response that 
could impair the primary mission. Speed and efficiency are critical in major emergency 
responses. Only adequate preparation for cooperative and coordinated efforts by law 
enforcement and the National Guard can produce timely and effective action. 
3. Raise 
Increasing the frequency of training at the Mutual Aid Region level will provide 
all local jurisdictions and the National Guard the opportunity to interact and problem 
solve in a NIMS environment. In addition, the exercises could have the added benefit of 
increasing participation by business and volunteer partners by allowing them to work 
with government agencies in planning for potential terrorist threats. 
The awareness of resources available to local authorities during a mutual aid 
event and the process for requesting state and federal assistance can also be increased by 
planning, training and exercises. This awareness can improve efficiency, effectiveness 
and speed of major mutual aid response requiring state and federal participation. 
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4. Create 
The object is to work with the Office of Emergency Services and Department of 
Homeland Security to create guidelines for civil authorities requesting mutual aid. These 
guidelines should be based on NIMS and address issues of resources, command and 
control, communication, logistics and other standard operational issues. These guidelines 
will also need to apply to the California National Guard and serve to inform 
USNORTHCOM, if they are ever called to respond.  
Memorandums of Agreements between law enforcement agencies and military 
bases within their communities have proven to be effective for years. It is reasonable to 
expect that statewide agreements would also have a positive impact. The guidelines 
would require the creation of training programs for the California National Guard, police, 
fire and public health personnel in the standardized protocols established by OES and 
DHS. 
Training would require the creation of tabletop exercises for National Guard 
Liaison Officers and local law enforcement personnel with Incident Command roles. The 
exercises would use realistic scenarios and require interaction with all levels of 
government within the structure of the new protocols and NIMS. If adequate funding is 
acquired, full scale operational exercises would enhance the training benefit. 
The next section will overlay the traditional methodology of Stakeholder Analysis 
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V. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A survey was intended to be the primary source of information regarding the 
position of essential stakeholders potentially involved in National Guard support of law 
enforcement. An extensive email survey was sent to California’s 58 sheriffs and their 
Emergency Services managers. The rate of return was only 8% on the mail survey and 
4% on the email survey.45 The responses fell into two categories. Those few who actually 
responded to the questions indicated that the jurisdictions utilized special units of the 
National Guard in search and rescue and narcotics eradication efforts. They had a good 
relationship with the National Guard at that level, but were not certain what to expect in 
the event of a major response. The larger group of respondents did not respond to the 
questions because they had no recent experience in utilizing National Guard support. 
None of the agencies surveyed indicated they had policies, protocols or guidelines 
governing their interaction with the National Guard as a mutual aid responder. 
The limited response to the survey can be attributed to the fact that there has not 
been a major National Guard response to assist law enforcement since 1992. Very few 
individuals who were in positions of leadership at that time are still in active service. In 
order to supplement the survey responses, individual stakeholder interviews were 
conducted to provide a wider and broader picture of stakeholders’ perceptions and 
expectations regarding National Guard support for law enforcement in California. 
The consensus derived from interviews with representatives of the 58 sheriffs and 
350 police chiefs reflect that California law enforcement leaders are not confident that 
they are prepared to integrate the National Guard effectively into a major response to a 
terrorist attack or natural disaster. They do not train with the National Guard and few 
have plans or policies that guide their interaction with the National Guard. Law 
enforcement leaders, National Guard leadership and the Commission on Peace Officers 
Standards and Training are all supportive of efforts to develop common guidelines, joint 
training, and improved interaction that will prepare both law enforcement and the 
National Guard for the potential of a major joint response. 
                                                 
45 California State Sheriff’s Association (January 4, 2007), survey by author. 
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A. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS  
The strengths of California’s emergency capabilities begin with its long history of 
mutual aid within the disciplines of fire and law enforcement. Annual wild land fires, 
floods, and periodic earthquakes have helped to refine an effective system. The primary 
weakness is that with the exception of fire responses, there has not been a major federal 
or military response to civil authorities for 13 years, so any experience gained has been 
lost to change of personnel. 
Based on the results of the literature review and stakeholder analysis the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats can be identified and categorized. This 
technique is helpful in identifying the internal and external elements of the current 
situation, the desired change, and the hopeful outcome of the proposed change. In the 
following matrix, the current status of law enforcement capabilities for support is 
compared with the desired state of the relationship between the National Guard and law 
enforcement. Finally, the actions required to accomplish the desired changes are itemized 








“As is” Performance 
Measures 
Value Proposition and 
Critical Links 




• Mutual Aid 
• EMAC 
• Positive local 
Relationships 
• Disaster experience 
• Build on existing 
relationships 
• Create a forum of 
stakeholders to create 
standardized protocols 
• Design training for joint 
ICS operations 
• Mutual Aid incorporating 
CNG protocols 
• Agreement on protocols 
and guidelines 
• Positive relationships at 
all layers of response 
• Training and exercises 
with all stakeholders 
Internal 
Weaknesses 
• Lack of resource database 
• Lack of experience in 
CNG assistance 
• Unclear relationship 
between OES and OHS 
• Lack of civil/ National 
Guard MOA 
• Produce resource 
database with OES, DHS 
and NORTHCOM 
• Produce statewide 
resource inventory 
• Regional exercises with 
Nation Guard 
• Complete resource 
inventory for Incident 
Commanders 
• Statewide protocol for 
civil/CNG responses 
• Regular interaction 
through joint exercises 
External 
Opportunities 
• State OHS support 
• State OES support 
• CNG support 
• USNORTHCOM liaison 
• Congressional interest 
• State Assembly interest 
• Involvement of CNG and 
L.E. in state and regional 
meetings 
• Involve stakeholders in 
revising State Mutual Aid 
plan 
• Schedule regular L.E./ 
CNG exercises 
• Regular forum for all 
stakeholders 
• Specific mutual aid 
guidelines supported by 
local, state and federal 
responders 
• Political support at state 
and federal levels 




• Natural disaster 
• Terrorist attack 
• Civil Disorder 
• Withdrawal of funding 
• Withdrawal of political 
support 
• Design protocols 
matching each of the 15 
threat category listed in the 
National Response Plan 
• Regularly test and 
modify protocols and 
capability inventories 
• Adequate funding 
• Plans and exercises 
covering All-Hazards 
• L.E. and CNG fully 
prepared to act effectively as 
a team 
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The most significant opportunity lies in the sincere interest on the part of the 
stakeholders to improve their response capability and coordination. The accompanying 
threat is that the next terrorist attack or natural disaster may occur before adequate 
preparations are completed. The basic thread that ran through the law enforcement 
interviews was they wanted to ensure that if California experienced an event that was of 
such a magnitude that mutual aid resources were not sufficient and the National Guard 
was required, they would not want to repeat the law enforcement performance during the 
Los Angeles Riots or Hurricane Katrina. 
B. CREATING AN AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
Changing the natural inclination to take comfort in the status quo is always a 
challenge, especially when dealing with organizations with a long heritage such as the 
military, and many law enforcement agencies. The advantage is in the case of military 
support to law enforcement, both emergency responders and the public recognize that the 
status quo failed to provide an optimal use of resources based on the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. The magnitude of terrorist threats keeps the issue on the forefront. A 
national directive for agencies at every level to comply with the National Incident 
Management System creates the expectation that agencies will work together to develop 
practical and effective procedures for making the national model work at a local level. In 
many cases that expectation exceeds reality. There is considerable momentum for change 
at every level, but that will dissipate over time if the opportunity for change is not seized. 
The consumers of the mutual aid system in California are the sheriffs, police 
chiefs, fire chiefs, public health directors, California Highway Patrol and California 
National Guard who comprise the State’s first response capability. Despite their 
confidence in the mutual aid system, they are aware the military support is not a function 
that has been utilized to the extent of a major National Guard deployment since the early 
1990’s.  
Exposing legislators and state agency heads to after-action reviews of major 
exercises will provide an awareness that coordination and mutual understanding between 
law enforcement and the National Guard needs to improve. Involving key decision 
makers in Emergency Operating Centers during earthquakes, fires, and floods will expose 
them to the complexities of major multi-jurisdictional efforts. Inviting them to meet with 
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the various state law enforcement associations will provide them insight regarding the 
frustrations that local incident commanders experience when evaluating their ability to 
react to worst-case scenarios requiring National Guard support.  
C. IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
The analytical tools used in the strategy apply to business, but also to the goal of 
changing the way California approaches a civil/military response to major events. 
Creating change in one jurisdiction is challenging. Affecting 58 counties and 350 cities, 
along with state and military partners, requires a carefully thought out plan that focuses 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Specifically defining the responsibilities of the National Guard and law 
enforcement in a mutual aid environment can be approached at several different levels. 
The first option is to change the governing legislation empowering and limiting the role 
of the Guard. The primary advantage would be to create a common all-hazards game plan 
that would apply to Guard deployments within a state, as part of the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), or at the direction of the President. The level 
of resistance that could be encountered by the states and the complexity and time that 
would be required reduces the viability of this option. This option would require massive 
changes on a state, local and national level.  
The second option would be to change the federal protocols and guidelines to 
clearly define the role of the National Guard in assisting law enforcement. This would 
avoid disadvantages and opposition to changing legislation. It would focus on the more 
bureaucratic functions of amending existing military publications and the National 
Incident Management System. The narrower focus makes this option more attractive in 
terms of the goal of this thesis. It still requires consensus or agreement between branches 
of the federal government and the 50 states, which is a disadvantage. The implementation 
impacts will be explored because this option falls within the acceptable range in terms of 
time and effort. 
The third and recommended option proposes achieving the same goal within the 
confines of the State of California. The elimination of the need to find national agreement 
or to deal with the specific distinctions governing the National Guard in 50 states makes 
this a proposal that is readily achievable, while still making a positive recommendation 
capable of changing the State’s response capabilities. If a successful model were 
established in California, it could provide a template for other states to follow. Because of 





A. AMEND FEDERAL LAW TO ESTABLISH MANDATORY GUIDELINES 
FOR NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT 
This option would require amending Title 10 and 32 of the United States Code, 
and the Posse Comitatus Act, to establish national guidelines to define the specific 
responsibilities of the National Guard in supporting local law enforcement. Legislative 
action to update and clarify the responsibilities of the National Guard in support of law 
enforcement would require the involvement of the Department of Defense, Department of 
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, national police, fire and 
public health associations, and the governors of all fifty states. President Bush has 
already raised the issue of expanded powers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the 
National Governors Association expressed opposition to the federal government posing 
additional controls on state militias. 
The time and degree of political support required to make these changes presents 
an immense political and administrative challenge. The advantage, however, of a national 
solution is that even when a governor deploys the National Guard, that governor can also 
request National Guard assistance from other states. Only national solutions will create 
compatibility when multiple National Guard units respond to a single local event. A more 
careful analysis will be reserved for the following two options, because of their greater 
likelihood of being successfully supported by the critical participants. 
B. AMEND THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN AND NATIONAL 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
This option would entail amending the National Response Plan and National 
Incident Management System, within existing law, to establish protocols that specify the 
responsibilities of the National Guard, when supporting local law enforcement. 
This option could resolve inconsistencies between civil and military responders 
through administrative rather than broad legislative remedies. Administrative changes 
would require the involvement of national police associations to make recommendations 
intended to expand the process of information gathering and foster public debate. NIMS 
is a relatively new mandate for the states and the National Guard and will undoubtedly be 
subject to modification as more agencies comply. 
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A national protocol would require the agreement of 50 governors who have 
authority over their National Guard units. There is already strong disagreement about the 
growing powers of the federal government. The beginning of this effort could be the 
establishment of appropriate protocols in a single state that can be adopted by the 
remaining states. As an example, California’s State Emergency Management became a 
model for the development of the National Incident Management System. It could also be 
established through a committee process through the National Governor’s conference. 
This may receive more support by the governors than the imposition of a national 
administrative or legislative standard. On the other hand, it may be difficult to find 
consensus between states. However if agreement was achieved, it may be possible to 
establish clear protocols for civil authorities and the National Guard in a reasonable 
period of time.  
1. Inputs 
It is reasonable to expect that FEMA and DHS would be the key advocates of any 
legislation creating mandatory operational protocols to supplement the provisions of 
NIMS and the National Response Plan. The participation of states, Department of 
Defense, National Guard Association and the key national law enforcement associations 
would also be important. Agency efforts coupled with legislative staff participation 
would be needed to create recommendations to forward to the congressional sponsors. 
2. Output 
The output would be legislation creating specific mandatory protocols for the 
implementation of the operational provisions to supplement the National Incident 
Management System. The provisions of the legislation would need to be reflected in a 
document that would join NIMS and the National Response Plan as a guiding document 
for federal, state and local emergency responders. 
3. Outcomes 
The outcome would be a national integration of emergency responders that would 
standardize command and control, communications, and tactical protocols. An event of 
national significance, such as Hurricane Katrina would benefit from a multi-jurisdictional 
response in which all participants were educated in common terminology, 
communications, command structures and tactics. Negative outcomes could realistically 
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include serious opposition by the states. Several Governors have already expressed 
concern with the Federal influence over their National Guard units. There could also be 
resistance based on the financial implications of any national standards and conflict with 
the differing laws and governmental structures present in the states. 
4. Benchmarking Plan 
The national emergency response protocols of other democracies would be 
valuable as comparisons to proposed guidelines for emergency responders. The Rand 
Corporation evaluated the terrorist response systems of Israel, France, Germany, 
Australia, and Great Britain.46 A similar comparison of allies would be beneficial in 
determining the value of recommended policies for this country to guide the support of 
our military. A secondary component of this process would be evaluating which practices 
of other nations might be applicable if they had our system of strong state’s rights. 
It would also be helpful to compare specific provisions of the mutual aid policies 
regarding civil/military interaction would be the targets of the benchmarking effort. If 
there were information regarding the success of implementing those policies and 
practices available, that data would provide valuable insight. 
C. EXPAND THE CALIFORNIA MUTUAL AID PLAN 
The recommended option is to expand the California Law Enforcement Mutual 
Aid Plan to include protocols and training requirements for National Guard support for 
law enforcement in the event of a terrorist attack, domestic disorder, or catastrophic 
natural disaster. 
This option would be limited to California and would not avoid some of the 
national issues that would require legislation or federal administrative action. By 
restricting the project to a specific state, a realistic number of stakeholders could actively 
participate in the process of identifying, testing, and recommending change. The 
stakeholders currently operate under a clearly understood and frequently tested mutual 
aid system, but it is largely silent on specific interaction with the National Guard, with 
the exception of deployment guidelines. 
                                                 
46 U.S. General Accounting Office, COMBATTING TERRORISM: How Five Foreign Countries are 
Organized to Combat Terrorism (Washington, D.C., GAO, April 2000).  
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California has frequent natural disasters and periodic episodes of civil unrest. It 
has four high-risk urban centers, which include Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, 
and Sacramento. The Center for Asymmetric Warfare, which organized the AWI-03 
exercise, is based in Port Hueneme and has agreed to test recommendations from this 
project into a future regional training exercise. California has a large National Guard and 
many military bases, so there is a strong interest in the issue of National Guard support in 
the event of a major attack or natural disaster. 
Bringing together stakeholders under the authority of the Office of Emergency 
Services could result in the development of specific agreements for interaction between 
law enforcement and the National Guard. These protocols could be designed for each of 
the foreseeable major threat categories. The results could become part of California’s 
Mutual Aid Guidelines and could be included in training for Incident Command 
personnel. 
The development of protocols will promote agreement, greater communication 
and understanding. It must be coupled with training to ensure the lessons learned will be 
applied in an actual event. California is divided into mutual aid regions that could easily 
serve as exercise sites to reinforce the curriculum on National Guard support to law 
enforcement. The involvement of National Guard Liaison Officers in each exercise will 
bring valuable military perspective to the process, and will create personal trust and 
relationships with law enforcement Incident Command personnel. This process would be 
further developed if the National Guard routinely provided a Liaison Officer to work in 
the law enforcement Emergency Operating Center during actual law enforcement 
activations. Restricting training simulations to tabletop exercises will limit both costs and 
scheduling problems, but is not as desirable as full scale exercises. A desired outcome 
would be to create command leadership teams representing key regional stakeholders 
who know each other and train together on a scheduled basis, rather than the historic 
approach of bringing together strangers from agencies with differing practices to deal 
with a true crisis.  
1. Inputs 
The input required to create standardized and integrated protocols for utilizing the 
California National Guard to assist local authorities is minimal. The direct costs would 
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include travel, food and lodging for the stakeholders participating in forums. If the 
protocols required training, the costs could be considerable depending on whether 
command and control personnel, or all possible law enforcement and military personnel, 
are included. Restricting the training to regional tabletop exercises focusing on personnel 
likely to be assigned to an Incident Command role would be far more affordable. 
Since much of the work can be performed off-site, the process may require 
several days in-residence for approximately fifteen agency representatives, the majority 
of which have their offices in Sacramento. There would also be a direct cost for updating 
the Mutual Aid guidelines, printing checklists for specific hazards, and distributing 
capability and resource lists of National Guard and law enforcement assets.  
Capability lists are currently available within many of the affected agencies and 
only need to be collected and incorporated in state mutual aid documents distributed to 
incident commanders. The final direct cost would be the funding for regional tabletop 
exercises involving local, state and federal responders, most of which would be managers 
on fixed salaries. 
The key non-monetary input would be the time required to build political and 
agency support and coordinate stakeholder discussions leading to the production of 
statewide mutual aid protocols specifically addressing National Guard support of law 
enforcement. Additional time will be required to test the protocols and build experience 
through exercises in each of California’s mutual aid regions. 
2. Outputs 
The outputs are tangible. The production of a Memorandum of Agreement 
between the National Guard, Office of Emergency Services, Office of Homeland 
Security, and California’s police chiefs and sheriffs is the primary output. As part of this 
document, a broad listing of agency capabilities related to each of the threat scenarios 
addressed in the National Response Plan should be included. Organizational chart 
templates for the various threat scenarios should be included as a guideline defining 
agency responsibilities. The final output will be training and a series of exercises directed 
at teaching local, state and National Guard responders to work through scenarios in 
keeping with the new protocols. 
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3. Outcomes 
The desired outcome is the creation of standardized response protocols to provide 
practical guidance for California law enforcement and military responders that will allow 
them to work effectively in an integrated command and control environment. This 
outcome can be measured in several ways. First, production of the newly expanded 
mutual aid protocols is a measurable product, as is the production of training materials 
and the number of training sessions and exercises provided. Secondly, the knowledge of 
the materials can be tested, and the performance of command and control personnel can 
be evaluated in training exercises and simulations. 
It is not anticipated there will be any meaningful resistance from the stakeholders 
to the standardization of emergency response protocols, but other outcomes can be 
expected. The California State Legislature, local law enforcement and the National Guard 
will have to wrestle with the cost of producing the product, instruction, testing and 
training. It is likely funding might be a shared responsibility of the state and local 
government. 
Another outcome will be the numbers of people agencies are willing to commit to 
the process, at the expense of other responsibilities and their own budgets. This outcome 
will have less impact if the training involves primarily management personnel with 
command and control responsibilities, since they do not generate overtime costs. A 
positive offsetting outcome will be the gain in confidence that stakeholders can rely on 
each other in a unified effort requiring both speed of response and effective use of 
resources. From a political standpoint, all parties should experience public support for 
efforts to better prepare California communities for major emergencies. 
4. Benchmarking Plan 
The target of benchmarking would be the existence of state protocols for Civil 
military emergency responses, especially as they relate to the National Guard and 
military bases within each state. The degree to which these standardized protocols are 
documented, understood and tested through training should also be measured where 
possible. 
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The logical point of comparison would be the Offices of Emergency Services for 
each of the other 49 states. It has already been determined the State of Illinois has an 
active project. A site evaluation would provide a point of comparison to California’s 
current state of readiness and the desired outcome. A poll of the OES Directors could 
produce information for comparison with the remaining states.  
A secondary approach would be to determine if USNORTHCOM, DHS or FEMA 
have participated in efforts to create statewide protocols governing the relationship 
between civilian authorities and military responders. Any product produced in 
cooperation with other states should be helpful in producing protocols designed to meet 




VII. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
The recommended option must be accompanied by a clear implementation 
strategy. Homeland Security grant funding is being concentrated into four high-priority 
urban regions in California. The majority of law enforcement agencies are left without 
resources for expanded programs related to homeland protection. It is unlikely increased 
funding will become available, so it will take action by the Governor and the Office of 
Emergency Services to prioritize the standardization of state mutual aid protocols 
governing civil/military interaction and then train incident commanders in the guidelines 
and agreements. The truth is most agencies have purchased the critical equipment they 
need to protect their officers in the case of a chemical or biological attack. Much of the 
funded training is of local value only and does not address the need for a major National 
Guard response. 
Recommendations and potential solutions by the law enforcement/National Guard 
stakeholders’ committee and the California Office of Emergency Services can be 
strengthened by combined support by the California State Sheriffs’ Association and 
California Police Chiefs’ Association. Prior discussions with the Homeland Security and 
Office of Emergency Services directors will help to make the case that this effort is a 
priority. Statewide training is necessary because the terrorist’s target is not predictable 
and every major agency needs to be prepared to effectively use National Guard 
assistance. 
Another way of accomplishing the mission within existing resources is to limit the 
training to key personnel in every mutual aid region who would have significant 
decision-making responsibilities within an Emergency Operating Center. It would be a 
luxury to train all first responders, but integration with the military is primarily a 
command and control issue, and equipping people who work within that framework 
would be sufficient and would dramatically reduce costs. 
A. CREATING MOTIVATION 
Significant motivation to succeed in joint responses to major emergencies already 
exists. In an environment of 24/7 cable news, populated by expert critics, neither law 
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enforcement, fire, or the military want to endure the level of criticism that followed 
Hurricane Katrina. A process to follow and the certainty that political endorsement and 
resources will support the effort are essential to creating a standardized command and 
control protocol for law enforcement/National Guard responses.  
One strategy is to initially enlist key stakeholders as a means of encouraging 
others to participate in order to avoid an unfavorable comparison. If the Governor and 
Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Services commit to proceeding with the 
project, it will be difficult for other stakeholders to abstain. If the National Guard and the 
state associations for sheriffs and police chiefs join the effort, it would raise serious 
media and political issues for agencies that refrained from participating in training or 
exercises. An additional strategy is to break the challenge into incremental steps that are 
very achievable. The task of getting a large and diverse set of stakeholders to agree on 
common protocols can appear daunting, but once broken down into specific action steps 
it is no longer intimidating. 
B. CREATING POLITICAL SUPPORT 
Political support is essential to the success of this effort. The path of ensuring 
support is clear, if not easy to achieve. All of the stakeholders, with the exception of 
USNORTHCOM, depend on the Governor, Office of Homeland Security and the Joint 
Terrorist Task Forces for access to Homeland Security grant funding. The California 
Sheriffs’ Association and California Police Chiefs’ Association are represented on the 
task forces and their recommendations carry significant influence. The process of 
conducting interviews as part of researching this thesis turned out to be an effective 
method to begin building political support. As the problems and proposals were 
discussed, key stakeholders freely expressed unsolicited support for the proposal. Their 
comments are recorded as an indication of existing political support and a reflection on 
how efforts to obtain additional support may be received. 
The cooperation of the Governor’s law enforcement liaison is vital to helping 
forge alliances among the key state stakeholders, because he has knowledge of the 
personalities and agencies’ priorities. The creation of a key support group will provide 
momentum to the project, and making a public announcement of the Governor’s support 
will assure the project will continue to completion. The Governor’s staff can also help to 
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identify detractors and their concerns, so they can be mitigated. The creation of a strong 
coalition for change and early media attention to the effort would make it difficult for 
important stakeholders to resist the change. The State Assembly’s Emergency Services 
committee is also an important voice that should be included in the coalition for change. 
There is every reason to believe the majority of political; law enforcement, and 
National Guard leaders will support the effort to standardize joint responses based on a 
desire to improve public safety. When a strong coalition, with support of the Governor, 
joins the effort it will assure all of the stakeholders, except the most ardent detractors, 
participate in the effort. 
The Governor’s Public Safety Liaison is a former county sheriff with considerable 
experience in local law enforcement and state government. He agreed to assist in the 
development of this concept and provided additional contacts in the National Guard and 
Office of Emergency Services. He advised that the lead agency on any statewide law 
enforcement and military implications should be either the Office of Emergency Services 
or the Office of Homeland Security. He further offered the support of his office.47 
The Chief of the Office of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Branch, was 
interviewed regarding his observations and recommendations regarding the concerns and 
proposals contained in this paper. He stated California does not have standing State 
Terrorism Task Force, but did have a temporary Strategic Committee on Terrorism 
following the attacks of 2001.48  
The Chief confirmed the State Mutual Aid Guidelines cover only the following 
topics in regard to military support for local authorities: legal authorities and 
responsibilities of the National Guard, conditions of availability of National Guard 
resources, authority of the Governor to deploy the Guard to emergency without a local 
request, limitations on missions accepted by the CNG, role of OES in processing 
requests, and the timetable for deployment of a Liaison Officer and additional assistance. 
He confirmed the Mutual Aid Guidelines do not provide an inventory of military 
                                                 
47 Tom Sawyer (Governor’s Law Enforcement Liaison, Sacramento, CA) interview by author, 
November 12, 2006. 
48 Charles Simpson (Office of Emergency Services, Monterey, CA), interview by author, October 4, 
2006. 
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capabilities, although the National Guard does possess the information and it is available 
upon request from local authorities. The Guidelines also do not describe the role of a 
military Liaison Officer in the ICS/ Unified Command environment, although military 
officers can access a three-day training program related to the role. There is also an 
Administrative Order governing what California agencies, including the CNG, can 
provide in terms of assistance to local authorities. Information regarding CHG restrictions 
and capabilities are not part of the published Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. 
The Chief also agreed modest training exercises for each Mutual Aid Region 
would be an appropriate way of introducing interaction between National Guard Liaison 
Officers and law enforcement stakeholders. He believes there is value in adding input 
from the military and homeland security stakeholders to the information provided in the 
Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan. Universally applicable protocols, guidelines and 
requests could provide important guidance to local authorities. Finally, he was supportive 
of using the input of associations representing local authority to educate the military on 
the practical aspects of applying NIMS in a local response. 
The Director of the Office of Homeland Security is another critical stakeholder in 
any effort to further define the relationship between the California National Guard and 
local law enforcement. He has experience with a highly active state Joint Terrorism Task 
Force in Illinois and was interviewed regarding his experience in both Illinois and 
California. 
The Director expressed that in addition to the CNG response to the 1992 Los 
Angeles Riots there have been more contemporary major deployments of the California 
National Guard.49 The Guard has been deployed twice to provide additional security at 
California’s major airports following the 9/11 attacks. The Guard was deployed under 
Title 32, which entitled the troops to exercise law enforcement powers while being paid 
by the federal government. The other contemporary major response was “Operation Jump 
Start” during which the Guard was deployed to assist the Immigration and Custom 
Enforcement agents in securing the border with Mexico. Neither of these deployments 
resulted from a mutual aid request from local law enforcement. 
                                                 
49 Matt Bettenhausen (California Office of Homeland Security), interview by author, November 30, 
2006. 
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The Director agreed that there was merit to assembling a stakeholder group 
including the Office of Homeland Security, Office of Emergency Services, National 
Guard, and law enforcement representatives to plan for future joint operations. He 
believes that the Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Services should 
appropriately take the lead in the effort. The potential areas he believed could benefit 
from a joint planning effort were discussed, including command and control, 
communications, logistics, unified command, and mission oriented requests. He added 
that the Adjutant General, of the California National Guard previously discussed the need 
for collaboration with local law enforcement before the next major joint response occurs. 
The Brigadier General of the California National Guard reviewed the main 
elements of the proposal and offered the support of the CNG. He stated that the 92 Los 
Angeles Riots revealed the flaws in both law enforcement and the California National 
Guard in terms of military support to civil authorities. The CNG worked with LAPD and 
LASO in a training exercise called Angel Gate 93 in order to learn lessons from the 
response to the 1992 riots. The General felt that it was a productive experience, but it 
only applied to one region and the value has been eroded by the passage of time. 
The General explained that the CNG has 15,700 troops, of which 11,000-12,000 
could be available to assist local law enforcement. If the event were multi-jurisdictional, 
the deployment would have to triage according to priority. He welcomed the opportunity 
to meet with stakeholder groups at the state and regional level to share information and 
pre-plan responses to ensure the most effective joint effort. He did not express any 
concern over the cost or scheduling impact of joint meetings or tabletop training 
exercises. He was also very interested in supporting active interaction between CNG 
liaison officers and Incident Command law enforcement personnel on a regional basis. 
The General stated preparation for joint law enforcement/military responses to terrorism 
requires a “cultural attitude shift.”50 He felt the interaction created by the proposed 
recommendation could foster that process. The General’s perspective is also enhanced by  
                                                 
50 Louis Antonetti (Brigadier General, California National Guard, Sacramento, CA), interview by 
author, December 29, 2006 
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the fact that he served as FEMA’s Executive Associate Director for Response and 
Recovery Directed Operations, and also the Director of the National Guard Bureau’s 
National Interagency Civil-Military Institute. 
The California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) 
sets training guidelines for state law enforcement agencies and audits compliance with 
those guidelines, along with providing financial reimbursement as specified by law. After 
discussing the recommended proposal, the Assistant Executive Director stated that he 
believes that this project touches on a “crucial issue” in California.51 He said three 
governors have unsuccessfully attempted to qualify the CNG personnel to be able to 
enforce state law. California law requires that individuals complete 64 hours of training 
to exercise police powers, under section 832 of the California Penal Code. National 
Guard units train under a schedule established to reflect national priorities and they do 
not have the funding or ability to deploy large numbers of personnel for non-mandated 
training. Any training related to military support of law enforcement would have to 
compete with the Guard’s other training demands in a time of war. The Assistant Director 
agreed that many of the lessons learned from the experience of the Los Angeles Riots had 
never been fully resolved and could recur if another major deployment was needed. 
The Assistant Director point out that joint training would be a routine matter for 
law enforcement personnel. Depending on the number of participants, regional training 
for joint responses may not require additional funding. He also pointed out that some 
CNG units have police officers on their rosters and at least have a representative who can 
exercise police powers under their state authority. He agreed that both training and 
exercises that focused solely on the command and control issues related to joint 
operations would be less expensive and possibly more compatible to the CNG’s training 
priorities and schedules. He concluded by stating that P.O.S.T. would support any effort 
to provide training that would enhance the Guard’s ability to support local law 
enforcement. 
The Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol discussed this proposal in 
concept and agreed with the need of pre-planning for a National Guard response. He has 
                                                 
51 Michael DeMichelli (Assistant Executive Director, Commission on Peace Officers Standards and 
Training, Sacramento, CA), interview by author, December 26, 2006.  
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expressed the need for advanced preparation in the past. He expressed his agency’s 
support for the recommended proposal and stated the C.H.P. would be a partner in any 
effort to create statewide guidelines.52 
With initial political support from the required state offices and agencies, the 
remaining support must come from California’s law enforcement community. At the 
quarterly meeting of the California State Sheriff’s Association the elements of this 
proposal were discussed. Approximately 40 of the 58 California Sheriffs were in 
attendance. The consensus was that these agency heads, who are responsible for policing 
half of the state population, were not comfortable with their understanding of their 
department’s interaction with the CNG in a major response environment. They felt that 
standardized guidelines for military and law enforcement agencies would be a valuable 
tool for fostering cooperative military support responses. The Executive Director agreed 
to submit a letter in support of the recommended proposal to the Governor.53  
The President of the California Police Chiefs’ Association offered the support of 
California’s 350 police chiefs to any effort to create standards, plan and train for military 
support from the CNG. His assessment was that the reorganization of the California 
Office of Emergency Services and the Office of Homeland Security would be an 
opportunity to incorporate the National Guard. He further stated there is “great value in 
some pre-planning and, if nothing else, people getting in the same room and forming 
some partnerships.”54 He also offered that the National Guard response to reinforce our 
borders would have benefited from the same type of planning effort with border law 
enforcement agencies.  
The process of measuring political support has actually created support. Each 
succeeding interview gained momentum from the fact that other stakeholders had  
 
 
                                                 
52 Mike Brown (Commissioner California Highway Patrol, Sacramento), interview by author, 
December 8, 2006. 
53 Steve Stavley (Executive Director, California State Sheriffs’ Association), interview by author, 
Ventura, CA, September 28, 2006. 
54 Steve Krull (President, California Police Chiefs’ Association), interview by author, January 11, 
2007. 
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expressed support. Decision makers from key agencies have already taken positive 
positions and could comprise the nucleus of a committee to begin the process of 
implementing the recommended option. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The preferred option has been identified and political support from the critical 
stakeholders is building as a result of the interview process. In order to take advantage of 
the positive momentum, a specific set of action items need to be proposed to other 
stakeholders. The following implementation steps are listed in the order that would most 
likely lead to achieving the desired change: 
Action Items 
 
1. Gain the formal support of the Governor, Office of Emergency Services, 
Office of Homeland Security, and the National Guard to establish a 
stakeholder committee for creating statewide guidelines for National 
Guard support of local law enforcement, within the parameters of the 
National Incident Management System. 
2. Request the Governor issue an Executive Order to assign responsibility to 
the Office of Emergency Services to develop standards, guidelines and 
training for the National Guard related to support of law enforcement 
authorities. 
3. Task a committee under the Office of Emergency Services to recommend 
military support guidelines for both law enforcement and the National 
Guard. This committee should include the State Sheriffs’ Association, 
State Police Chiefs’ Association, Commission on Peace Officers’ 
Standards and Training, California Highway Patrol, and USNORTHCOM, 
in addition to the initial agencies approving the committee process. 
4. Present recommendations to the Office of Emergency Services, Homeland 
Security and the Adjutant General of the National Guard for final 
amendments and presentation to the Governor for approval. 
5. Assign the Commission for Peace Officers’ Standards and Training to 
create a training program for law enforcement and military command and 
control personnel. The training could be a qualification for a certification 
qualifying personnel for Incident Command assignments. 
6. Request the Governor and California’s legislative delegation support 
National Guard funding and scheduling requirements to conduct training 
and associated exercises for military personnel who serve as the Liaison 
Officers (LNO) to law enforcement. 
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7. Request that the Governor requires the California National Guard to train 
their emergency responders in accordance with state law, so that they 
qualify to enforce the Penal Code in support of a law enforcement role. 
8. Identify training funds from existing budgets or from additional 
appropriations to the P.O.S.T. budget for law enforcement training and 
exercises. Additional appropriations will require the support of the 
Governor and State Legislature. 
9. Schedule training at the mutual aid region level, which includes the 
National Guard and the law enforcement agencies within each region. 
Since the protocols relate primarily with the command and control element 
of the State Emergency Management System, tabletop scenarios with the 
same personnel who might be identified as having an ICS role or be 
assigned as a Liaison Officer in the event of an actual deployment should 
be sufficient. The objective will be to produce experienced command and 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The legendary football coach Vince Lombardi used to say that the will to 
win is not the most important thing; the will to prepare to win is the most 
important. Anyone who gets into a fight wants to win, but if he hasn’t 
prepared ahead of time, he will be at a distinct disadvantage. Similarly, in 
our fight against terrorism, we must prepare to win. We must prepare for 
the next attack…55 
This thesis began with a quotation from former Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
followed by a metaphor taken from the world of sports. It will conclude in the same way. 
Attorney General Ashcroft lived through the difficult days following 9/11, when the role 
of the FBI and other intelligence agencies were being quickly redefined. He presided over 
the investigation of the attacks in New York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania. He 
struggled with the knowledge that an unknown number of terrorists could still be 
planning domestic attacks. Through all the uncertainty, he was motivated by the memory 
of innocent people hurling themselves out of the windows of the World Trade Center to 
escape the flames. His zeal for his job was also fueled by the knowledge that we faced an 
enemy who would never stop trying to destroy us, no matter how long it took. If we had 
the same clarity and memory today, we would address our responsibility to plan, train, 
and practice together with a sense of urgency. Whether we are dealing with an Olympic 
basketball team, a law enforcement SWAT team, or a military unit preparing for battle, 
the following basic elements are required to ensure success. 
A. HAVING A COMMON PLAYBOOK 
The National Incident Management System and National Response Plan have 
clearly defined the roles of federal and local agencies in the event of a terrorist attack or 
natural disaster, but they do not address the myriad of operational issues that are critical 
to an efficient multi-level emergency response. The California National Guard operates 
under state law and the control of the Governor in their Title 10 status and does not 
function exactly like the active duty military or the National Guards in other states. 
                                                 
55 John Ashcroft, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice (Center Street, New York 
NY. Townhall.com, October 2006), 281. 
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The process to develop guidelines proposed here for law enforcement and the 
CNG will help them standardize responses to civil requests anywhere in the state. The 
involvement of all stakeholders, prior to an actual deployment, could resolve many 
potential conflicts regarding command and control, logistics, communications, training, 
terminology, processes, and chain of command. These guidelines would require the 
reinforcement of a training process for both law enforcement and the CNG.  
B. CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE AND FREQUENT PRACTICE 
A survey of California’s 58 sheriffs, and input from a representative of the 350 
police chiefs, revealed that jurisdictions desire greater participation with the California 
National Guard in planning and exercises designed to equip both entities for a major 
deployment of military personnel or the participation of the CNG in a Unified Command 
in support of law enforcement. 
Both law enforcement and the military understand successful actions require 
realistic training and the value of such training erodes with time. The recommended 
option proposes that, at a minimum, the CNG participates at the mutual aid region level 
with law enforcement Incident Commanders in training exercises scheduled on a 
recurring basis. 
C. KNOWING AND DEVELOPING TRUST IN YOUR TEAMMATES 
Guidelines and systems are of great value, but at any level of endeavor a team 
functions most effectively when individual participants develop a relationship of trust 
based upon common knowledge and experience. A military unit or specialized law 
enforcement team would never consider entering a dangerous situation that required them 
to rely on people they do not know or have earned their confidence. In addition to 
training and practicing as organizational units, this proposal recommends training with a 
select group of law enforcement personnel and a designated Liaison Officer assigned to 
that mutual aid region. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Lieutenant General Russel Honore was the Joint Task Force Commander who 
provided the most visible and effective leadership in the days immediately following the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. In response to an inquiry about what he thought 
law enforcement should know about National Guard support, he stated that based on his 
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experience, “The first responders and any other response organization should have 
exercised and collaborated before the storm. The scene of a disaster is not the place to 
exchange business cards.”56 He also recommended that coordination between law 
enforcement and the National Guard could be improved by threat specific planning 
accompanied by training in which potential participants are stressed to the point of 
failure. 
California’s law enforcement and military responders cannot afford to ignore the 
lessons learned from prior events. We will have to rely on National Guard support for law 
enforcement in future catastrophic events as we have in the past. The residents of this 
State have a right to expect an effective, coordinated and rapid response to a life 
threatening disaster. Only by beginning to plan, train and exercise together can law 
enforcement and the California National Guard fulfill their obligation to be at their best 
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